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Labeled by one lawmaker as “the worst financial product out there,”1 the 
payday loan drives many borrowers into long-term debt because the borrowers 
cannot repay a high-cost loan in a short time frame and in a single payment, as 
required by the typical loan contract.2  Consequently, many borrowers suffer 
serious financial harm, including lacking money to pay monthly bills, 
experiencing disconnection of utility services, and even being forced to file for 
bankruptcy relief.3 
                                                            
 1. 151 CONG. REC. E1386 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Luis Gutierrez).  
Similarly, some Republicans have called payday lenders loan sharks and predatory lenders.  See, 
e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7981 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter) 
(identifying members of Congress who urged passage of legislation to protect the troops from 
payday lending and thanking “all of them for their great work and also to the gentleman [Robert 
Simmons (R-CT)] for his hard work on payday lender and trying to make sure that our troops 
have a good situation now and will not be the victims of loan sharks”); 152 CONG. REC. S6406 
(daily ed. June 22, 2006) (statement of Sen. James Talent) (“[P]redatory payday lenders are 
targeting American troops and are trying to make a buck off of their service to our country. . . . I 
recognize that payday lending can be a risky business, but a triple-digit interest rate, which is 
commonly charged today, is simply too much.”). 
 2. See, e.g., JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & U.S. 
PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP PAYDAY 
LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 6 (2001), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf (finding that payday loans are a coercive 
practice that require repayment of the principal in a short period of time and lead to long-term 
indebtedness). 
 3. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday 
Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011).  One academic conducted a comparative study 
of households in states with and without access to payday loans over a five-year period, 
eventually concluding that access to payday loans “increases households’ difficulty in paying 
mortgage, rent and utilities bills” and positing, though not as strongly, that such access 
“increase[s] the likelihood of delaying needed medical care, dental care and prescription drug 
purchases.”  Id.; see, e.g., DENNIS CAMPBELL, ASÍS MARTÍNEZ JEREZ & PETER TUFANO, 
BOUNCING OUT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INVOLUNTARY BANK 
ACCOUNT CLOSURES 2, 39 (2008), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/cprc/ 
conferences/2008/payment-choice/papers/campbell_jerez_tufano.pdf (finding that payday 
borrowing increases the risk of involuntary bank-account closures); Michael S. Barr, Jane Dokko 
& Ben Keys, Financial Services, Savings, & Borrowing Among Low- and Moderate-Income 
Households, Presentation at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Conference on the 
Community Reinvestment Act 2, 21–22 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/ 
research/Conferences/2009/2-6-2009/Keys_presentation.pdf (comparing low- to moderate-
income payday borrowers in the Detroit metropolitan area with similar households that did not 
use payday loans and finding that payday borrowers were twice as likely to be evicted, three 
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Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) created the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection (CFPB), which has regulatory authority to protect consumers from 
payday lending.4  However, several Republican lawmakers have taken actions 
aimed to put the CFPB, America’s first consumer financial watchdog, on a 
tight leash.5  Those actions include introducing a series of bills intended to 
weaken the CFPB’s overall power6 and to reduce its funding.7  For example, 
one proposed bill would replace the CFPB’s current leadership structure of one 
director with a five-member bipartisan commission.8   
Besides to proposing bills to limit the CFPB’s effectiveness, Republicans in 
the U.S. Senate successfully blocked one vote to confirm a director for the 
                                                                                                                                         
times as likely to file for bankruptcy, and almost three times more likely to have utility service 
disconnected). 
 4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1011, 1022, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964, 1980 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5512 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 5. See infra notes 7–8. 
 6. See Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. app. at 81, 88 (2011) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals Hearing] 
(testimony of Professor Adam J. Levitin, Georgetown University Law Center) (discussing four 
bills that, according to Professor Levitin, would hinder the CFPB’s effectiveness before it even 
began exercising its regulatory authority); see also 157 CONG. REC. H5326 (daily ed. July 21, 
2011) (statement of Rep. Mazie K. Hirono) (opposing the proposed Consumer Financial 
Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011 because it “seeks to limit the 
independence and effectiveness of the CFPB”). 
 7. See Financial Services and Central Governmental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2434, 112th 
Cong. §§ 101–102 (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 112-136, at 8 (2011).  For example, Representative Jo 
Ann Emerson, Chairwoman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services, 
introduced a bill to cap the CFPB’s funding for the 2012 fiscal year and to place further funding 
under the purview of the congressional appropriations process.  See H.R. 2434, §§ 101–102.  
Currently, the CFPB’s funding falls outside Congress’s reach because the Federal Reserve funds 
CFPB’s operations, and the yearly funding is capped at approximately 10% of the Federal 
Reserve’s total operating expenses.  Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a)(1), (2)(A); see also Legislative 
Proposals Hearing, supra note 6, at 83 (testimony of Professor Adam J. Levitin, Georgetown 
University Law Center) (explaining that the CFPB “has less budgetary independence than any 
other federal bank regulator” because of this cap).  An additional proposed bill would facilitate a 
panel of financial regulators’ ability to reverse any CFPB regulations by reducing the required 
veto vote from two-thirds of the panel members to a simple majority.  See Consumer Financial 
Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. § 102 
(2011).  But see Legislative Proposals Hearing, supra note 6, at 85 (testimony of Professor Adam 
J. Levitin, Georgetown University Law Center) (arguing that H.R. 1315 “provides an unnecessary 
and possibly unconstitutional check on the CFPB and should be eliminated”). 
 8. Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of 2011, H.R. 1121, 112th 
Cong. § 2 (2011).  But see Legislative Proposals Hearing, supra note 6, at 83 (testimony of 
Professor Adam J. Levitin, Georgetown University Law Center) (recommending that House 
representatives vote against the bill because “switching to a five-member panel would tilt the 
balance at the agency to gridlock and inaction, would add unnecessary big government bloat, and 
would reduce accountability”). 
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Bureau.9  As was widely reported, these lawmakers refused to confirm Richard 
Cordray as director not for lack of qualification, but to “force structural 
changes to the agency.”10 In response, President Barack Obama used his 
executive power to appoint Mr. Cordray as the director during a Senate 
recess.11  Amid threats from the financial-services industry to challenge the 
legality of his appointment,12 Mr. Cordray, taking cue from President Obama,13 
is rightfully focusing his attention on all financial entities engaged in payday 
lending.14   
At the first field hearing as director, Mr. Cordray announced that the CFPB 
had begun examination of non-bank lenders and released guidelines for 
examination procedures.15  Non-bank payday lenders16 are snubbing their 
noses at state lawmakers by continuing to offer loans in circumvention of state 
laws.17  Payday lenders charge fees that equate to triple-digit annual interest 
                                                            
 9. See Laura Meckler & Victoria McGrane, Obama Picks Nominee Fight, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 5, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020351360457714099078506343 
0.html. 
 10. See, e.g., id. 
 11. David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in Consumer 
Post, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1. 
 12. See Kate Davidson, Citi on CFPB: Lawsuits ‘Likely to Come From Every Quarter’, AM. 
BANKER (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:45 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_8/citi-lawsuits-
cfpb-1045627-1.html?zkPrintable=true.  The Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Justice 
Department released a memorandum that explained the recess-appointment process and 
concluded that President Obama’s appointment was legal.  See Memorandum from Virginia A. 
Seitz, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Lawfulness of Recess Appointments 
During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions 17–18 (Jan. 6, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf. 
 13. Ylan Q. Mui, Obama Praises Consumer Bureau, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2012, at A11 
(quoting President Obama as stating that “irresponsible debt collectors and payday lenders and 
independent mortgage servicers and loan providers . . . are bound by the same rules as everybody 
else”). 
 14. See Maya Jackson Randall, Consumer Bureau Targets Payday Loans, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020430140457717100106677 
2154.html (quoting Cordray as telling a crowd in Birmingham, Alabama that payday loans will be 
given “much more attention” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 15. Id.  Mr. Cordray also announced the release of Short-Term, Small-Dollar Lending 
Procedures, which CFPB examiners will use when they visit banks and non-banks to assess their 
payday loan operations. Id.  See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, EXAMINATION 
PROCEDURES: SHORT-TERM, SMALL-DOLLAR LENDING PROCEDURES, available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Short-Term-Small-Dollar-ending-
Examination-Manual.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
 16. In this Article, “non-bank payday lenders” refers to those institutions that fall outside of 
the mainstream financial institutions, such as banks and credit unions.  Cf. REBECCA BORNÉ ET 
AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BIG BANK PAYDAY LOANS 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/big-bank-payday-loans.pdf 
(distinguishing non-bank payday-loan lenders and mainstream banks). 
 17. See infra Part II.A.1–4 (explaining the four methods payday lenders have used to avoid 
state regulation). 
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rates, issue loans frequently in excess of the borrower’s next paycheck, and 
require borrowers to repay the loans in a single balloon payment—usually in 
two weeks.18  Payday loans are considered so predatory that several states have 
banned payday lending or have capped the annual percentage rate (APR) at 
36% or less.19  
To stop payday lenders from skirting state laws, this Article asserts that the 
CFPB should exercise its rulemaking authority to declare many payday loan 
practices as unfair, deceptive, abusive, and, consequently, unlawful.20  Part I 
explains how payday lending ensnares the majority of borrowers in a debt trap.  
For instance, because large repayment amounts are due within a short time 
frame, the majority of payday borrowers cannot repay the entire loan on time 
and thus must pay multiple rollover fees to extend the due date or obtain 
additional consecutive loans.21  Part I also describes how some payday lenders 
repeatedly debit borrowers’ bank accounts to collect rollover fees and thereby 
force borrowers to close their bank accounts to stop these rapacious collection 
activities.22 
Part II describes the schemes non-bank payday lenders use to avoid state-law 
restrictions on payday loans.  To circumvent the definition of a payday loan or 
to avoid being classified as an entity regulated by payday-loan statutes, payday 
lenders tweak their loan products, masquerade as different types of financial 
institutions, partner with Native American tribes, obtain different lending 
licenses to operate, or drop their licenses altogether.23   
After discussing non-bank lenders, Part II moves on to describe the role of 
mainstream financial institutions in payday lending.  As uncovered in a recent 
report surveying four states, major banks finance 42% of non-banks’ payday 
lending.24  Major banks, such as Wells Fargo, also offer their own versions of 
payday loans, usually under the misnomer of “direct deposit advances,” which 
                                                            
 18. Jean Ann Fox, Safe Harbor for Usury: Recent Developments in Payday Lending, 
ADVANCING CONSUMER INT., Fall/Winter 1999–Spring/Summer 2000, at 7, 7. 
 19. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.40(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (capping  
short-term loan APRs at 25%). 
 20. The Dodd-Frank Act grants the CFPB authority to prevent financial-service providers 
from “committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive or abusive act or practice.”  Dodd-Frank 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 21. See, e.g., URIAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,  FINANCIAL 
QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY 
FEES EVERY YEAR 3, 4 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-
lending/research-analysis/rr012exec-Financial_Quicksand-1106.pdf (stating that rollover fees 
extend a loan’s due date). 
 22. See infra Part I. 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See NICHOLAS BIANCHI, NAT’L PEOPLE’S ACTION, PROFITING FROM POVERTY: HOW 
PAYDAY LENDERS STRIP WEALTH FROM THE WORKING-POOR FOR RECORD PROFITS 12 (2012), 
available at http://www.npa-us.org/files/images/profiting_from_poverty_npa_payday_loan_ 
report_jan_2012_0.pdf. 
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are only available to customers who arrange for direct deposit of their income 
checks.25  These bank-issued loans have triple-digit interest rates and short 
maturity dates, require single balloon payments, and give banks unfettered 
access to the borrowers’ bank accounts.26  Therefore, these bank-issued loans 
are not meaningfully distinguishable from non-bank payday loans because they 
have the same predatory characteristics and, therefore, need to be regulated.27  
Part III describes the CFPB’s broad rulemaking authority over all financial 
institutions and its enforcement authority over regular non-bank payday 
lenders as well as large financial institutions.28  However, the CFPB lacks 
enforcement authority over smaller financial institutions; therefore, this Article 
posits that the CFPB can, and should, use its various powers to persuade 
prudential regulators of smaller financial institutions to exert enforcement 
authority over them to secure their compliance with the herein proposed 
regulations.29   
                                                            
 25. See JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., BANK PAYDAY LOAN PRODUCTS 1 
(2009), available at http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/CFA%20-%20Bank%20Direct 
%20Deposit%20Payday%20Loan%20Products,%20Aug.%203,%202009.pdf; Alex Ulam, 
Consumer Groups Call N.Y. Plan an Invitation to Usury, AM. BANKER, Jun. 2, 2011, 
http://www.nedap.org/documents/2011-06-02AmericanBanker.pdf. 
 26. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY LOANS SPREADING 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY LOANS SPREADING], available 
at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/banking_and_payment_systems/ib_bank_payday_ 
spreading.pdf (reporting that bank-issued payday loans are spreading and specifically identifying 
Regions Bank as the most recent large bank to offer payday loans).  Unless otherwise indicated, 
“mainstream financial institutions” includes banks and credit unions, whereas “non-banks” refers 
to the typical payday lender, as well as companies masquerading as other entities to avoid state 
law.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON: HOW THE GOVERNMENT’S PUSH 
FOR DIRECT DEPOSIT OF SOCIAL SECURITY EXPOSES SENIORS TO PREDATORY BANK LOANS 16 
(2010) [hereinafter NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON], available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/runaway-bandwagon.pdf (explaining why bank-issued 
payday loans “look just like payday loans”). 
 27. See Ulam, supra note 25; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY 
LOANS SPREADING, supra note 26, at 1 (explaining how bank-issued payday loans have “the 
same dangerous features of traditional payday loans that make them unaffordable and lead to a 
debt trap”); Maya Jackson Randall & Alan Zibel, Banks’ Direct-Deposit Advances Spark Lending 
Debate, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311 
1904006104576502793158420916.html (reporting the story of a borrower who had experience 
with non-bank payday loans from six lenders and a direct-deposit loan from U.S. Bank, who 
stated that based on her experience, “the [U.S. Bank loan is] the same as any [non-bank] payday 
loan”). 
 28. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1025(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1990 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (Supp. IV 2010)).  The Dodd-Frank Act defines large 
financial institutions as those institutions having more than $10 billion in assets.  Id.; see also 
Adam Belz, Iowa Community Bankers Worry New Regulations Could Bind Them, DES MOINES 
REG., Aug. 7, 2011, at 1D, available at 2011 WLNR 15619427 (reporting that the nation’s largest 
banks control 79% of the financial markets, whereas smaller financial institutions control only 
11%). 
 29. See infra Part III.A; see also Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(24)(A)–(B) (identifying the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the prudential regulator for insured depository 
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Part III explains how the CFPB should exercise its rulemaking authority to 
declare that several payday-loan practices are unfair, deceptive, and abusive.  
Such declarations would be similar to a federal law that restricts payday 
lending by bank and non-bank lenders to military personnel in several ways, 
including capping the APR at 36% on loans to active-duty military members 
and their dependents.30  Although the CFPB is explicitly prevented from 
establishing a national usury limit,31 it should pass a regulation making it 
unlawful for any lender to charge an interest rate in violation of applicable 
laws.   
Part III also asserts that the CFPB should establish regulations that define 
payday loans and expand the scope of regulated entities to address the growing 
trend of lenders using ruses to avoid applicable laws.32  Additionally, it should 
declare the following practices as unfair, deceptive, or abusive: short maturity 
dates, single balloon payments, multiple rollover or refinancing fees, multiple 
back-to-back loans, and repetitive electronic bank-account access. These 
practices mislead many consumers and cause them to enter into financial 
transactions under terms they cannot hope to fulfill, thus destining them to 
suffer substantial economic injury. 
The CFPB’s imposition of restrictions on payday loans will not end  
short-term, small-dollar loans in America, but will cause an increased 
prevalence of responsible lending practices.  The results of a recent pilot 
program implemented by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
demonstrate that lenders can issue small-dollar loans subject to the types of 
restrictions proposed above and still achieve long-term profitability.33  
Therefore, the CFPB’s regulatory intervention will correct the continuing 
market failure by promoting profitable, yet fair loans by responsible lenders.  
I.  THE DEBT TRAP OF PAYDAY LOANS 
When payday loans—also known as payday advances, deferred-deposit 
loans, or cash-advance loans—emerged over twenty years ago,34 the  
payday-loan industry claimed that they were a short-term financial solution for 
                                                                                                                                         
institutions and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) as the prudential regulator for 
insured credit unions); id. § 1026(a) (defining smaller financial institutions as those with $10 
billion or less in assets). 
 30. John Warner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, sec. 
670, § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006)). 
 31. Id. § 1027(o). 
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
 33. Rae-Ann Miller et al., A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot 
Program, 4 FDIC Q. 28, 28 fig.1, 32 (2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical 
/quarterly/2010_vol4_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol4No2_SmallDollar.pdf. 
 34. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (2002). 
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families low on cash.35  However, consumer advocates quickly recognized that 
payday loans were, and still are, a financially destructive form of short-term 
credit.36  The fees charged to obtain a payday loan usually amount to APRs 
totaling several hundred percent and some payday loans today even have APRs 
exceeding 1000%; consequently, payday loans are one of the most expensive 
forms of credit available.37  In addition to the astronomical APRs associated 
with payday loans, other problematic loan terms, such as short maturity dates 
and single balloon payments, trap many individuals in a financial nightmare 
from which it is very difficult to escape.38  As discussed below, the  
payday-loan industry’s business model and practices depend on ensnaring 
consumers via repetitive access to their bank accounts and multiple rollovers 
and loans.39  
A.  Electronic Access to Consumers’ Bank Accounts Facilitate the Debt Trap 
In the early days of the industry, a consumer obtained a payday loan by 
physically going to a store, presenting identification and proof of income, and 
giving the store clerk a post-dated personal check totaling the amount of the 
loan plus fees.40  The consumer was then required to pay the loan in full by its 
due date, usually two weeks from the original loan date.41  If the consumer 
failed to appear in person to pay off the entire loan by the due date and, 
thereby, reclaim the check,42 the lender would normally present the check to 
the consumer’s bank for loan repayment.43  Clearly, this early repayment 
                                                            
 35. See, e.g., Ray Lewis, CG: Base Offers Alternatives to Payday Lenders, MARINES  
(Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.marines.mil/unit/basecamppendleton/pages/news/2005/CG%20Base 
%20offers%20alternatives%20to%20payday%20lenders.asp (quoting a representative for Money 
Tree, a payday lender with a store located in San Diego, as stating that payday loans are a  
“short-term solution”). 
 36. See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart & Jean Ann Fox, Payday Loans: A High Cost for a Small 
Loan in Low-Income and Working Communities, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 589, 589–90 (2001) 
(describing the trap of payday lending as a “debt treadmill”). 
 37. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday 
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564–65 & n.1 (2010); see also Renuart & 
Fox, supra note 36, at 589 (“The typical annual percentage rate is at least 390 and averages close 
to 500 percent, although advocates and credit code enforcement agencies have noted rates of 
1,300 percent to 7,300 percent.”).  For example, a loan of $400 for a fee of $100 due in fourteen 
days equates to an APR of 650%, or $2600.  See Martin, supra, at 589 & n.1; see also Michael A. 
Satz, How the Payday Predator Hides Among Us: The Predatory Nature of the Payday Loan 
Industry and Its Use of Consumer Arbitration to Further Discriminatory Lending, 20 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 123, 129 (2010) (characterizing the fee as a finance charge that should be 
viewed in terms of an APR rather than a flat fee). 
 38. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 39. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 40. Johnson, supra note 34, at 9–10. 
 41. Satz, supra note 37, at 129. 
 42. Johnson, supra note 34, at 10. 
 43. Barbara A. Monheit, The Regulators Speak, in 1 CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES 
LITIGATION 2003, at 459, 505 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1361, 
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method could result in non-payment if other checks cleared before the lender’s 
presentment and reduced the balance to zero.44  
Payday lenders quickly realized the ineffectiveness of the old-fashioned  
check-presentment process and developed more efficient payment processes, 
most specifically electronic access to the borrowers’ accounts.45  As one state 
regulator uncovered, some payday lenders’ initially gained electronic access by 
obtaining borrowers’ personal identification numbers (PINs) during the loan 
application process and then later used the PINs, without the borrowers’ 
knowledge, to withdraw funds.46   
Instead of deceptively obtaining PIN numbers, the majority of payday 
lenders now have consumers sign contracts that allow electronic debits to their 
bank accounts to facilitate payment of the entire loan or only the rollover fee.47   
Ordinarily, a consumer could revoke a debit authorization to avoid a 
negative balance and future overdraft fees; however, a recent trend in debit 
access is based on opaque contractual language intended to overrule the 
borrower’s attempted revocation.48  Payday lenders use the borrower’s  
bank-routing information to create a demand draft, which is an electronically 
created, unsigned check by which the lender withdraws money from the 
borrower’s bank account without the borrower’s knowledge or explicit 
approval.49  As a result, the lender can unilaterally withdraw funds from the 
borrower’s bank account despite the borrower’s previous request that the bank 
stop all electronic debits.50   
                                                                                                                                         
2003) (“When the loan is due, the lender expects to collect the loan by depositing the check or 
debiting the borrower’s account or by having the borrower redeem the check with a cash 
payment.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 10. 
 46. The Payday Loan Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on 
Fin. Servs. of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. app. at 59 (2009) [hereinafter Payday Loan 
Reform Act Hearing] (testimony of Jean Ann Fox, Director of Financial Services, Consumer 
Federation of America) (stating that examiners for the Idaho Department of Finance discovered 
that several lenders, including Check ‘n Go, used borrowers’ PINs to electronically access 
borrowers’ bank accounts). 
 47. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 32 n.156 (discussing the author’s study of payday lenders 
in Franklin County, Ohio, which discovered that the majority of payday lenders had contractual 
language requiring the borrower to agree to an electronic debit); see also Payday Loan Reform 
Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 58–60 (describing the electronic debit authorization process). 
 48. See Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s 
New Economic Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 
111th Cong. 91–92 (2009) [hereinafter Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing] 
(statement of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (stating 
that online payday lenders used borrowers’ personal information to withdraw funds from the 
borrowers’ accounts per language in the original loan contract). 
 49. See id. (defining demand drafts as “unsigned checks created by a third party to withdraw 
money from consumer bank accounts”). 
 50. Id. (documenting that lenders created “demand drafts when consumers exercised their 
[Electronic Funds Transfer Act] right to revoke authorization to electronically withdraw money 
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Even when borrowers ask their banks to close their accounts to stop a 
payday lender’s debits, banks routinely honor the debits causing the bank 
accounts to become active again and triggering additional overdraft fees by the 
banks.51  Some consumer advocates now refer to this scenario as a zombie 
bank account and have to assist the borrowers in making the banks stop debits 
after the bank accounts have been closed.52  
Consumer advocates argue that the foregoing methods of withdrawing funds 
from borrowers’ accounts violate state consumer-protection laws and exploit 
loopholes in federal laws.53 
These electronic-withdrawal methods set off an avalanche of detrimental 
consequences for consumers.54  For borrowers with insufficient funds, the 
lender’s repeated attempted debits can expose borrowers to numerous overdraft 
or insufficient-funds fees.55  For example, one payday lender charged its 
borrower a $20 return-debit fee, and the borrower’s bank charged her $2500 in 
overdraft fees as a result of her account balance being insufficient to cover the 
loans and other checks drawn on the account.56  Consequently, although the 
payday loan is marketed as a better alternative to overdraft programs, it can 
result in the borrower incurring substantial overdraft fees. 
                                                                                                                                         
from their bank accounts”); see, e.g., Dan Sorenson, Unregulated Online Lenders Can Mean 
Stress, Frustration, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Mar. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://azstarnet.com 
/business/local/article_4c1c4cc5-75d8-587c-954c-48b94430bf59.html (illustrating how one 
borrower’s bank refused to allow access to her account to stop a payday lender from taking out 
large amounts of her money). 
 51. See, e.g., E-mail from H.C. Klein to Claudia Wilner, paydayloans@yahoogroups.com 
(Nov. 22, 2011, 5:20 PM) (on file with author). 
 52. See, e.g., E-mail from Claudia Wilner to paydayloans@yahoogroups.com (Nov. 22, 
2011, 2:58 PM) (on file with author). 
 53. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 38, 91 (statement 
of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (testifying that 
state regulators condemned demand drafts to the Federal Reserve Board because lenders used 
them to defraud consumers). 
 54. See Renuart & Fox, supra note 36, at 590; see also Sorenson, supra note 50 (stating that 
an online payday lender debited a borrower’s account every week for $60 to $70 for two months 
and that when the borrower was finally able to contact the lender’s representative, the lender 
would not tell her how much she owed on the $300 loan, but encouraged her to keep making 
rollover payments). 
 55. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 88–91 (statement 
of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (describing 
overdraft fees, usually around $25 per overdraft transaction). 
 56. See, e.g., Marc Lifsher, Internet, Regulators Target Loans from Tribes, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2009, at B1 (reporting that the borrower attempted to stop lenders beforehand from 
debiting her account once she realized that her employer’s direct deposit of her income check 
would be delayed); Sorenson, supra note 50 (stating that an attempted electronic debit resulted in 
a $35 fee for insufficient funds because the borrower’s account balance was too low, and that 
although the borrower attempted to revoke her debit authorization, the borrower’s bank refused to 
honor it immediately and thereby allowed the lender to continue debiting her account). 
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As a result of consumers’ debit authorizations, payday lenders often make 
numerous withdrawals of funds for renewals or rollovers.57  These debits result 
in consumers’ repeated and immediate payment of high fees and deprive them 
of much-needed funds for high-priority expenses, such as utility bills and 
housing.58  Online payday lenders, which are now a widespread enforcement 
problem for state regulators, use debit authorization and frequently create fixed 
dates to renew the loan every pay day automatically and withdraw only the 
rollover fee or finance charge from the consumer’s bank account.59 
The story of Bonnie Bernhardt illustrates how lenders use electronic access 
to collect fees, leave the principal unpaid, and perpetuate the debt trap.  Ms. 
Bernhardt, a single mother from Wisconsin, obtained a $300 loan with an APR 
of 782.14% from Arrowhead Investments, an online, Delaware-based payday 
lender.60  Because Ms. Bernhardt failed to repay the loan after two weeks, 
Arrowhead automatically “refinanced” the loan at a cost of $90 and did so 
eight more times in two-week intervals, resulting in a total of $810 in 
refinancing fees.61  Such refinancing did not give her additional cash; rather, it 
only served to generate profits for the lender by simply extending the due date 
on the loan for another two weeks.62  By the time Ms. Bernhardt came up with 
                                                            
 57. See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 50. 
 58. See, e.g., id.; see also Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, ‘Payday Loans’ Often Snowball, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at A1 (stating that a single mother of two children paid $180 in 
monthly fees on two $200 loans); Barr, Dokko & Keys, supra note 3, at 21 (reviewing a study of 
payday borrowers in Detroit showing that lenders were more likely to suffer eviction or 
disconnection of utility services). 
 59. CFA: ‘High Risks’ in Online Payday Lenders’ Websites, AM. BANKER (Dec. 20, 2004), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/cuj/2004_250/-237381-1.htm.  State regulators have tried to 
stop payday lenders from using electronic access to raid a consumer’s bank account.  For 
instance, the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services (ODCBS) recently issued a 
cease-and-desist order against Global Payday Loan (GPL), an online Salt Lake City-based 
company operating through Payday-Loan-Yes.com.  Global Payday Loan, LLC, No. I-11-0024, at 
4–6 (Or. Dep’t Consumer & Bus. Servs. July 1, 2011) (order to cease and desist and order 
assessing civil penalties).  According to the order, GPL debited consumers’ bank accounts for an 
origination fee of at least $30 and then debited the accounts for finance charges ranging from $30 
to $250 to renew the loan every two weeks.  Id. at 3.  Some borrowers resorted to closing their 
bank accounts just to stop GPL from withdrawing these fees.  Id.  The ODCBS fined GPL 
$90,000 for violating the state’s payday lending statute by being unlicensed and issuing loans 
with effective APRs ranging from 353% to 2737% to Oregon borrowers.  Id. at 3–6.  Oregon state 
law caps the APR for payday loans at 36% and origination fees at $10 per every $100 loaned and 
places restrictions on renewing existing loans.  Id. at 9. 
 60. Pat Schneider, Online Payday Loans Pose New Challenges for Consumers, Regulators, 
CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.) (Feb. 22, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local 
/article_ba5dbf62-d466-5c7d-86b7-0977603fc490.html. 
 61. Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 80–97, Bernhardt v. Arrowhead Invs., Inc., No. 
07CU4773 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 2009). 
 62. Id. ¶¶ 84–95. 
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enough money to pay the entire loan balance, she had paid a grand total of 
$1360 for a $300 loan.63     
B.  The Payday-Loan Industry’s Revenues: Earnings from Repeat Borrowers 
Besides anecdotal evidence, such as Ms. Bernhardt’s story, research shows 
that payday loans result in a long-term cycle of indebtedness for the majority 
of borrowers64 and that trapped, repeat borrowers are the source of most of the 
industry’s revenues.65  A study by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) 
demonstrates that “churning”—when lenders circumvent state-law prohibitions 
on rollovers or refinancing by closing out the current loan and almost 
immediately issuing the borrower a new loan—generates 76% of the industry’s 
profits, amounting to $20.6 billion in loans.66  Because payday lenders will not 
accept partial payments, it is common for consumers who are unable to provide 
lump-sum repayments to incur rollover or refinance fees, which results in an 
indebted aggregate far in excess of the original loan amount.67  Another CRL 
study found that 90% of payday-lending revenues comes from fees assessed on 
trapped borrowers and that the typical borrower pays back more than double 
                                                            
 63. Id. ¶¶ 96–97.  Ms. Bernhardt and 400 other Wisconsin residents obtained a court 
settlement for their class action lawsuit against Arrowhead, in which they split $100,000 in 
restitution, and Arrowhead agreed to forgive $432,000 in outstanding loans.  See Schneider, supra 
note 60.  The lender was also barred from doing business in Wisconsin for five years.  Id. 
 64. URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SPRINGING THE 
DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING REFORM 7 (2007), 
http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/pdfs2/07_1213_crl_springing.pdf (“The high price of a 
payday loan and the fact that it must be paid off in one lump sum two short weeks later, virtually 
ensures cash-strapped borrowers will be unable to meet their basic expenses and pay off their loan 
with a single paycheck.”); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.  According to the Center for 
Responsible Lending report, only 2% of payday lending transactions involve borrowers “who 
take out one loan, pay it off on time, and do not need to borrow again that year.”  KING & 
PARRISH, supra, at 7. 
 65. See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 21, at 6 tbl.1 (listing study results from select states 
indicating that, on average, 90% of payday lenders’ revenue comes from borrowers who obtain at 
least five payday loans per year). 
 66. See LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PHANTOM 
DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS, 
ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 7, 13 tbl.7, app. II at 27 (2009), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-demand-final.pdf 
(explaining the various ways churning occurs and stating that churning costs borrowers $3.5 
billion in fees annually). 
 67. See, e.g., FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 2, at 9 (finding that more than 50% of 
borrowers in North Carolina paid interest and fees that exceeded the initial loan amount); 
Sorenson, supra note 50 (stating that an online payday lender withdrew $60 to $70 from a 
borrower’s account every week for two months and then insisted that she still owed a balance on 
the $300 loan without specifying how much); supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text 
(discussing the refinancing fee that Ms. Bernhardt incurred, which amounted to $810 on a $300 
loan). 
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the amount of the original loan.68  Debunking the industry’s claim that payday 
loans are a short-term solution, research consistently shows that most 
borrowers obtain multiple rollovers or loans per year.69 Even during the 
recession years of 2007 to 2010, the nation’s largest payday lenders earned 
record profits from cash-strapped consumers.70  
As the CEO of one of the largest payday lenders explained, the design of the 
payday-loan debt trap is a deliberate business decision: “[T]he theory in the 
business is you’ve got to get that customer in, work to turn him into a 
repetitive customer, long-term customer, because that’s really where the 
profitability is.”71  Consequently, borrowers get stuck running on a debt 
                                                            
 68. See KING ET AL., supra note 21, at 6–8 & tbl.3 (“The typical payday borrower pays back 
$793 for a $325 loan.”). 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 7 (finding that the average annual number of loans per borrower shows 
that most borrowers are trapped in repeat borrowing); OHIO COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
TRAPPED BY DESIGN: PAYDAY LENDING BY THE NUMBERS 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.cohhio.org/pdf/919TrappedByDesignfinal.pdf (finding that the average annual 
number of loans is 12.6 percent and concluding that this results from borrowers’ inability to repay 
the full loan and fees in such a short time period and cover living expenses); PARRISH & KING, 
supra note 66, at 15 (finding that rollover borrowing is the rule, not the exception); LINDA A. 
WATTERS, MICH. DEP’T OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, REPORT ON THE BUSINESS OF PROVIDING 
DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICE TRANSACTIONS IN MICHIGAN 15 (2007), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cis/OFIS_DPST_REPORT_204749_7.pdf (finding that 
only 1.1% of payday loans were issued to one-time borrowers between June 2006 and June 2007, 
and that the average number of loans per borrower was 8.3).  Professor Michael Barr found the 
following: 
Evidence from multiple states points to the fact that significant proportions of payday 
loan consumers roll their loans over on a frequent, if not habitual, basis.  A study of 
payday borrowers in Illinois found that the median borrower had more than ten loan 
contracts over a two-year period, and that one-fifth of borrowers had twenty or more 
contracts in that time.  In Wisconsin, 56% of payday borrowers took out at least eleven 
loans in one twelve-month period.  In Indiana, 77% of all payday transactions were 
rollovers, and the average annual number of loan renewals was ten.  In North Carolina, 
the typical payday loan customer took out seven loans in one year from one lender.  
The CFSA study found that three-quarters of payday borrowers rolled over their loan at 
least once, and that 30% had seven or more rollovers.  Using the Wisconsin statistic as 
an example, the typical payday loan consumer, who takes out eleven two-week payday 
loans per year, for the average loan amount of $300, at the average 470% APR from the 
Consumer Federation of America (CFA) survey, spends nearly $600 annually in fees. 
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 156–57 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 70. See BIANCHI, supra note 24, at 10 (“Annual filings show that the nation’s major payday 
lenders collectively earn more from their high-cost cash advances than before the financial crisis. 
From 2007 to 2010 their combined revenues from payday lending have increased 2.6%, or some 
$30 Million in annual revenues.”). 
 71. KING & PARRISH, supra note 64, at 1 (quoting a telling comment made at a 2007 
industry conference by Dan Feehan, CEO of Cash America); see also KING ET AL., supra note 21, 
at 9 (pointing to industry practices that suggest competition to secure trapped customers, rather 
than a higher number of occasional borrowers).  Cash America is one of the six largest payday 
lenders in America.  BIANCHI, supra note 24, at 10. 
394 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:381 
treadmill72 and postpone necessary purchases, lose important utility services, 
and often must file bankruptcy to escape.73  In fact, one study of debtors in 
Texas found that payday-loan borrowers are approximately 88% more likely to 
file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in comparison to the general population.74 
Organizations that advocate for and assist consumers see firsthand the 
negative impact payday loans actually have.75  In a survey of non-profit 
organizations in Texas, respondents identified payday lenders as the greatest 
threat to consumer credit.76  In 2010, a survey of clients of Catholic Charities 
in Texas revealed that most could not repay a payday or car-title loan by its 
initial due date and most had trouble paying other bills after getting the loan.77  
Similarly, in a survey conducted by the Bell Policy Center of Denver in 2007, 
every credit counselor who participated in the survey and had payday-loan 
borrowers as clients responded that payday loans had harmed their clients 
                                                            
 72. Renuart & Fox, supra note 36, at 590 (discussing the “debt treadmill”); see also 
Johnson, supra note 34, at 55–65 (discussing the debt treadmill propagated by industry practices). 
 73. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the negative impact on many 
borrowers who obtain payday loans). 
 74. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 21 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/olin/conf08/skiba.pdf; see also Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong, 
Double Down-and-Out: The Connection Between Payday Loans and Bankruptcy, 39 SW. U. L. 
REV. 785, 803 (2010) (“[T]he data show that bankruptcy filers in New Mexico used a tremendous 
number of payday loans, and unquestionably far more than in the general population.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Testimony of Kelly Rand, Catholic Charities of Fort Worth—Close the CSO 
Loophole—Support HB 410, TEX. CATH. CONF. (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.txcatholic.org/ 
index.php/component/content/article/72-testimony-and-letters-82nd-legislative-session/1069-
testimony-of-kelly-rand-catholic-charities-forth-worth-close-the-cso-loophole-support-hb-410 
[hereinafter Testimony of Kelly Rand] (reporting that 20% of Texas Catholic Charities’ clients 
sought cash assistance through payday and car title loans and discussing these clients’ “financial 
stress”). 
 76. See TEX. APPLESEED, RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF SMALL-DOLLAR LENDING  
IN TEXAS: AFFORDABLE ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH-COST PAYDAY AND AUTO TITLE LOANS 14 
(2012), available at  http://www.texasappleseed.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc 
_download&gid=664&Itemid=. 
 77. See TEX. CATH. CONF. ET AL., 2010 CATHOLIC CHARITIES SURVEY ON PAYDAY AND 
AUTO TITLE LOAN USE 1 (2010), available at http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/Legal/ANPR/ 
Credit_Access_Business/2010%20Catholic%20Charities%20CABs%20Survey%20Exec%20Sum
m.pdf (reporting several findings including that “83% of payday or auto title loan users [that 
sought help from Catholic Charities] had trouble paying back the full loan when it came due,” 
“70% had to extend or get new loans because they could not pay the full loan amount,” and “77% 
of loan users believed that the loans made it hard to cover other bills”).  Because of the financial 
harm payday loans inflict, many religious organizations around the country are opposed to 
payday lending.  See, e.g., Emily Wagster Pettus, Associated Press, Miss. Religious Group Seeks 
End to Payday Loan Law, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2011, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9KUTJVG0.htm; Payday Lender Curbs 
Backed, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.) (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.courier-journal.com/ 
article/20111115/NEWS01/311150045/Payday-lender-curbs-backed (identifying numerous 
religious organizations in support of Kentucky passing legislation to curb payday lending); 
Testimony of Kelly Rand, supra note 75. 
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financially and “73% . . . said they would ‘never’ recommend a payday loan to 
a client.”78  Notably, 75% of credit counselors indicated that payday loans 
were “very harmful” to their clients’ ability to both make mortgage and rent 
payments and to pay other expenses.79  These and other studies80 confirm the 
financial hardship imposed on payday borrowers.81  Along with consumer 
advocates and non-profit organizations, the majority of federal lawmakers82 
and many state lawmakers now recognize that payday loans are not a 
beneficial form of short-term credit because of the long-term financial 
problems generated.83   
II.  NON-BANKS AND BANKS CONTINUE TO EXPAND THEIR PAYDAY-LOAN 
OPERATIONS 
Several states have been very actively trying to protect their residents by 
curbing payday lending.84  As explained below, payday lenders are essentially 
ignoring or circumventing state lawmakers’ recent attempts to curb payday 
lending.85  Moreover, some mainstream financial institutions are unwilling to 
allow only non-bank payday lenders to reap the significant profits of high-cost 
lending and now offer consumers their own versions of payday loans.86  These 
banks are free to ignore state laws restricting the predatory characteristics of 
payday loans because federal banking laws preempt such laws.87  Furthermore, 
the prudential regulator of the national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of 
                                                            
 78. Press Release, Bell Policy Ctr., Credit Counselors Unanimous: Payday Loans Harm 
Coloradans (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://bellpolicy.org/sites/default/files/PaydayCredit 
CounselorPR.pdf. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing other studies). 
 81. See, e.g., Testimony of Kelly Rand, supra note 75 (reporting that in Fort Worth, Catholic 
Charities “provided $800,000 of financial assistance in 2010 to clients struggling with payday or 
auto title loans”). 
 82. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. Congress’s passage of a 
federal law imposing numerous restrictions on payday loans to active-duty military families); see 
also Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians from 
Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (describing how even 
Republican lawmakers called payday lenders “loan sharks” on the debate floor when urging 
members of Congress to vote in favor of a federal law protecting military families from payday 
lending). 
 83. Cf. Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean 
Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 214–15 (2007) (citing Mark Flannery 
& Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 6 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. 
Research, Working Paper No. 2005/09, 2005)). 
 84. See Glen Fest, A Case for Payday Loans: There Actually May Be One, But Making It 
Won’t Win You Any Friends, U.S. BANKER, July 1, 2011, at 9, available at 2011 WLNR 
13079103 (reporting that ten states and the District of Columbia have banned payday lenders). 
 85. See infra Part II.A (discussing the schemes payday lenders devised to circumvent state 
laws). 
 86. See Ulam, supra note 25. 
 87. See, e.g., id. 
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the Currency (OCC), only offers guidelines for bank-issued loans that give the 
banks broad latitude to issue high-cost loans.88  Consequently, as explained in 
Part III of this Article, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which 
has rulemaking authority over banks and non-banks, needs to exercise its 
authority to protect consumers from payday lending. 
A.  Payday Lenders Find New Ploys to Avoid States’ Attempts to Regulate 
Them 
Although many academics and consumer advocates have uncovered 
numerous recent schemes employed by non-bank payday lenders to avoid 
state-law caps on APRs, several schemes are noteworthy.  In particular, payday 
lenders (1) make superficial changes to their loan products; (2) disguise their 
operations as different types of financial institutions; (3) create partnerships 
with Native American tribes; or (4) obtain different licenses to operate or drop 
their licenses altogether.  
1.  Lenders Tweak Products to Avoid Regulation 
Some payday lenders tweak their loan products to avoid falling within a 
state’s definition of payday loan so that they can skirt payday-loan regulations 
altogether and continue to charge exorbitant interest rates.89  For example, after 
Illinois passed the Payday Loan Reform Act (PLRA) in 2005, defining a 
payday loan as “a loan with a finance charge exceeding an annual percentage 
rate of 36% and with a term that does not exceed 120 days,”90 payday lenders 
increased the loan period by one day, called these products “installment loans,” 
and continued charging APRs in excess of 700%.91  This change in the 
maturity period did not go unnoticed by state legislators, who recently 
amended the PLRA to broaden the definition of payday loans covered by the 
statute.92  Payday lenders employed the same tactic in New Mexico and also 
substantially increased the cost of the loan.93  Not only are payday lenders 
using this tactic to avoid usury limits, but one survey of payday borrowing in 
New Mexico demonstrates that such tactics are also used to bypass the 
statutory limit on the number of outstanding loans a borrower can have and to 
                                                            
 88. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 89. See Martin, supra note 37, at 585–91. 
 90. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/1-10 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011). 
 91. See Martin, supra note 37, at 590 & n.145; see also S. 96-120, Reg. Sess., at 99–100 
(Ill. 2000). 
 92. Ill. S. 96-120, at 99–100 (quoting an Illinois state senator, Kimberly Lightford, as 
stating that “many lenders evaded that payday regulation by making consumer installment loans 
at a hundred and twenty-one days”). 
 93. See Martin, supra note 37, at 585–88 (providing, as an example, that a consumer who 
obtains a $500 loan would be required to repay the $500 and an additional $585 in interest and 
fees over the period of the loan, totalling $1085). 
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skirt database reporting requirements to prevent state regulators from 
accurately tracking payday lending.94 
Some payday lenders changed their loan products to be open-ended loan 
transactions to avoid interest-rate caps.95  Until recently, payday loans were 
closed-end transactions; that is, a single loan transaction payable by the due 
date.96  After the Virginia legislature passed a law restricting payday lending, 
many lenders began offering open-end payday loans and claimed that the loans 
were lines of credit, similar to a credit card, against which the consumer could 
borrow in the future once the initial loan was paid in full.97  By claiming to 
offer lines of credit, these payday lenders claim such credit products are 
outside the scope of payday-loan regulations, thus allowing lenders to charge 
fees exceeding state usury caps.98  For example, a $100 payday loan made in 
compliance with Minnesota’s payday-loan statute would restrict the APR to 
391%.  However, by making the loan open-ended, the payday lender charges 
an APR of 815% if it does not impose an annual fee and an APR of 2118% if it 
imposes an annual fee.99  Even when the loan is structured as open-ended 
credit, payday borrowers get trapped in a long-term debt cycle, potentially 
lasting a year or more, via multiple back-to-back loans.100  Consequently, the 
“open-ended” line of credit is merely a payday loan.101  
                                                            
 94. See id. at 586–89. 
 95. See id. at 590 (citing SCC Plugs Payday Lending Loophole, RESPONSIBLELENDING.ORG 
(Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/tools-resources/headlines/SCC-Plugs-
Payday-Loan-Loophole.html). 
 96. See Tom Shean, Credit Rules Won’t Protect Borrowers, Critics Say, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 
Apr. 13, 2007, at D2 (warning that payday lenders would avoid narrow regulations by 
“switch[ing] from their closed-end loans, which have defined amounts and terms, and use  
open-ended loans, the sort provided by credit card lenders”); see also RON ELWOOD & KARI 
RUDD, LEGAL SERVS. ADVOCACY PROJECT, HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF: A NEW GENERATION OF 
PAYDAY LENDERS EXPLOIT A LEGAL LOOPHOLE TO PICK MINNESOTANS’ POCKETS 17 (2010), 
available at http://www.mylegalaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/legal-loophole-report.pdf 
(defining a closed-end loan as a “one time transaction, with the balance payable on the due date”). 
 97. See Martin, supra note 37, at 590 & n.144. 
 98. See Kimball Payne, Payday Lenders’ Loophole Narrowed, DAILY PRESS (Newport 
News, Va.), Dec. 14, 2009, http://articles.dailypress.com/2009-12-14/news/0912130080 
_1_payday-lenders-open-end-credit-allied-title-lending. 
 99. See ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 13. 
 100. See, e.g., Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc., 708 S.E.2d 871, 872–85 (Va. 2011) (holding that a 
payday lender’s practice of making back-to-back loans violated Virginia’s prohibition of 
refinancings and renewals despite the lender’s claim that it issued the borrower thirty-three “new” 
loans). 
 101. The author’s conclusion that these restructured loans are disguised closed-end credit is 
contrary to one court’s interpretation.  See Janos v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. CV05-
1504PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 359758, at *6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the bank’s direct 
deposit advance program is an “open-end” plan). 
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2.  Payday Lenders Disguise Their Operations  
Rather than tweaking their loan products, some payday lenders are 
masquerading as different types of organizations or financial institutions.102  
For instance, payday lenders in Minnesota are perpetrating this deception to 
evade a 1995 payday-lending law limiting fees and interest rates and 
preventing rollovers.103  This law explicitly prohibited lenders from operating 
as industrial loan and thrifts,104 which were originally created during the Great 
Depression to provide consumers with funds to obtain affordable housing.105  
Unfortunately for Minnesota consumers, a subsequent amendment to the 1995 
law removed the prohibition and consequently created a loophole for payday 
lenders to exploit.106  
Since lenders learned of the loophole, the number of loans made by lenders 
claiming to be an industrial loan and thrift increased dramatically from only 21 
loans in 2003 to a whopping 161,031 loans in 2008.107  In contrast, the number 
of regulated payday loans dropped from a record high of 233,926 in 2004 to 
only 69,912 in 2008.108  Of the three licensed Minnesota payday lenders 
actively masquerading as an industrial loan and thrift in 2010, none offered the 
consumer financial services usually available from legitimately licensed 
industrial loan and thrifts, which notably do not issue payday loans.109  As a 
result of the rapid increase in the number of payday lenders masked as 
industrial loan and thrifts, researchers estimate that payday lenders have 
swindled Minnesotans of nearly $6 million in illegal fees, “[there]by 
subverting the basic purpose of the Industrial Loan and Thrift model, designed 
to provide home ownership opportunities and . . . to help stanch 
foreclosures.”110  In the early 1980s, one lending institution’s vice president 
commented that the thrifts were intended to serve consumers “who cannot 
borrow funds on a balance-sheet basis from commercial banks but who are 
deserving of credit at a much lower cost than 36 percent per annum.”111  
                                                            
 102. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of 
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1152–53 
(2008) (stating that payday lenders operate in Texas as “credit service organizations” and charge 
hefty “brokerage” fees for brokering loans from the payday lenders). 
 103. MINN. STAT. § 47.60 (2009); ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 13 (citing Act of Mar. 
24, 1995, ch. 202, art. 2, § 1, 1995 Minn. Laws, 917, 946–49 (codified as amended at MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 47.59, 47.60 (West Supp. 2011))). 
 104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.59. 
 105. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 844 (1996). 
 106. See ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 15; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.59. 
 107. See ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 16. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. Id. at 3. 
 111. Id. at 19 (quoting State ex rel. Duluth Clearing House Ass’n v. Dep’t of Commerce, 73 
N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. 1955)). 
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However, the APRs for payday loans are exponentially more than 36%.112  As 
will be discussed, the CFPB must play an active role in clearly defining a 
payday-lending business and must enforce penalties against those “disguised” 
lenders in noncompliance with applicable laws.113  
3.  Payday Lenders Create Rent-A-Tribe Partnerships  
In addition to masquerading as some other type of financial institution, some 
payday lenders are entering into partnerships with Native American tribes to 
avoid state law.114  These partnerships, commonly referred to as  
rent-a-tribes,115 are a reincarnation of the now-illegal partnerships with banks, 
known as rent-a-banks.116  In these partnerships, online payday lenders register 
businesses on Native American lands117 and claim to be exempt from lawsuits 
and state usury caps under tribal sovereign immunity.118  Using this doctrine, 
lenders argue that because their businesses are located on or headquartered 
within the borders of a Native American reservation, they are bound by the 
laws of that reservation only, not the laws of the state in which the reservation 
is located or the state in which the borrower resides.119   
Although several states, including California, Colorado, Maryland, New 
Mexico, and West Virginia, have initiated proceedings against online payday 
lenders claiming tribal sovereign immunity,120 enforcement actions against 
these entities have been somewhat unsuccessful.121  One court, however, 
                                                            
 112. See id. at 19 n.57; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 113. See infra Part III.A–B (explaining the CFPB’s authority to define payday lending and 
pass regulations expanding the scope of persons covered by the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 114. Michael Hudson & David Heath, Fights Over Tribal Payday Lenders Show Challenges 
of Financial Reform, IWATCH (Feb. 7, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org 
/2011/02/07/2151/fights-over-tribal-payday-lenders-show-challenges-financial-reform. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id.  For several years, payday lenders partnered with nationally charted banks to use 
the doctrine of federal preemption—available to national banks under the National Bank Act—to 
avoid compliance with state laws capping interest rates on payday loans.  See FOX & 
MIERZWINSKI, supra note 2, at 15–23.  Federal banking regulators eventually put an end to  
rent-a-banks, but only after years of numerous enforcement actions by state regulators, private 
lawsuits by consumer attorneys, and campaign efforts directed at the bank regulators by consumer 
advocacy groups.  See id. at 22–24; Hudson & Heath, supra note 114. 
 117. See, e.g., Hudson & Heath, supra note 114; Ben Mook, South Dakota Payday Lender 
Fights Cease-and-Desist Order by Md. Financial Regulators, DAILY REC. (Balt., Md.), May 15, 
2011, http://thedailyrecord.com/2011/05/15/s-d-payday-lender-fights-cease-and-desist-order-by-
md-financial-regulators, available at LEXIS, News & Business. 
 118. See Hudson & Heath, supra note 114. 
 119. See, e.g., Mook, supra note 117. 
 120. See Hudson & Heath, supra note 114. 
 121. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Payday Lenders Join with Tribes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
10, 2011, at C2 (reporting that since 2005, Colorado Attorney General John Suthers has tried 
(without success) to stop rent-a-tribe lenders from affecting his state’s residents); see also Cash 
Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Colo. 2010) (remanding to the 
trial court to determine whether tribal immunity applies to two payday lenders by considering the 
400 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:381 
provided some guidance regarding whether tribal sovereign immunity protects 
such partnerships.  In Ameriloan v. Superior Court, the California Department 
of Corporations sought to enforce state law against five online payday-loan 
companies claiming to be wholly owned by the Miami Tribe in Oklahoma.122  
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in concluding that tribal 
sovereign immunity did not apply to off-reservation activity, such as online 
payday loans issued to California residents.123  However, the court remanded 
the case for a factual determination of whether the companies were acting on 
behalf of the Miami Tribe, as tribal sovereign immunity would only insulate 
the lenders if the companies operate as actual “arm[s] of the tribe.”124  
State regulators argue that these payday lenders are not arms of the tribes, 
and that such arrangements are mere shams, intended to allow lenders to 
circumvent state law.125  For example, authorities in Colorado assert that only 
after the state initiated enforcement proceedings did the tribes incorporate the 
payday lending companies as tribal business enterprises and establish lending 
ordinances for their operations.126  Similarly, several states are pursuing 
enforcement actions against Martin A. Webb, a member of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe and the owner of several online payday-loan companies.127  The 
websites for two of his companies, Western Sky Financial and Lakota Cash, 
feature Native American logos but clearly state that each company “is owned 
wholly by an individual Tribal Member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
and is not owned or operated by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or any of its 
political subdivisions.”128  As one knowledgeable academic has rightfully 
pointed out, because an individual tribe member owns the payday-loan 
                                                                                                                                         
following: “(1) whether the tribes created the entities pursuant to tribal law; (2) whether the tribes 
own and operate the entities; and (3) whether the entities’ immunity protects the tribes’ 
sovereignty”). 
 122. 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 575–76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 123. Id. at 575. 
 124. Id. at 585–86 (quoting Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
 125. See, e.g., id. at 585. The California Department of Corporations urged the court to 
consider evidence “show[ing] the payday loan companies’ alleged tribal associations are ‘a 
sham,’ part of a ‘rent-a-tribe’ scheme designed to immunize their flagrant violations of” 
California law.  Id. 
 126. See Hudson & Heath, supra note 114. 
 127. See, e.g., Mook, supra note 117 (reporting that Maryland issued a cease-and-desist order 
against Martin Webb’s lending company for charging outrageous APRs and that Colorado’s 
attorney general filed a lawsuit against it as well); see also Press Release, Office of W. Va. 
Attorney Gen., Attorney General McGraw Sues Eight More Payday Lenders, Demands 
Companies Stop Doing Business in W.V. (Aug. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm?ID=533&fx=more (announcing charges against Martin Webb 
and his lending company in West Virginia for soliciting payday loans with illegal APRs). 
 128. See LAKOTA CASH, http://www.lakotacash.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); WESTERN 
SKY FINANCIAL, http://www.westernsky.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
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companies, rather than the tribe itself, these companies cannot be “arms of the 
tribes” and are not entitled to immunity.129   
4.  Payday Lenders Either Obtain Different Licenses to Operate or Drop 
Them  
Instead of modifying their business format or relationships, some payday 
lenders rid themselves of state licenses to operate and become illegal 
businesses to avoid regulation.130  Others obtain new licenses to operate under 
other lending statutes to avoid being covered by recently revised state  
payday-loan statutes.131  Ohio, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia 
have seen this happen.132  This problem has become so prevalent that one 
Florida lawmaker proposed legislation to make an unlicensed payday lender’s 
collection on an illegal payday loan a felony.133   
Ohio, in particular, has produced many glaring examples of payday lenders 
exploiting various state lending licenses.  In 2008, then-Governor Ted 
Strickland signed into law the Short-Term Loan Act134 to curb predatory 
payday lending.135  Specifically, the Short-Term Loan Act capped the 
maximum loan amount at $500,136 limited the APR on payday loans to 28%,137 
and mandated a loan maturity date at a minimum of thirty-one days.138  Shortly 
after its passage, the payday-loan industry loudly voiced its disapproval of the 
                                                            
 129. See Mook, supra note 117 (quoting Sarah Deer, a tribal law professor at William 
Mitchell College of Law, as stating that the “immunity argument might prove to be a tough one 
for Webb to prove since the companies are registered with the South Dakota Secretary of State 
and are not owned by the tribe” and that only the tribe can claim immunity, not an individual 
simply living on the reservation). 
 130. Payne, supra note 98 (explaining the unlicensed-lender problem in Virginia). 
 131. See, e.g., Associated Press, Payday Loan Restrictions Could Backfire, AUGUSTA 
CHRON., Dec. 24, 2010, http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/business/your-business/2010-12-
24/payday-loan-restrictions-could-backfire?v=1293308441 (stating that according to the South 
Carolina Board of Financial Institutions, “99 of the 245 payday lenders that discontinued their 
licenses in 2009 applied for a supervised license so they could make short-term, unsecured loans 
that don’t have the same restrictions as payday loans”). 
 132. See, e.g., id.; Payne, supra note 98 (stating payday lenders dropped their licenses in 
Virginia). 
 133. See S.B. 536, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010). 
 134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.35–1321.48 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
 135. Jim Siegel, Strickland Signs Payday-Lending Bill, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 8, 2008, 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2008/06/02/payday.html.  For a full list of the 
Act’s prohibitions, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41.  The Act also requires mandatory 
disclosures of fees and higher costs, as compared to other forms of lending, before issuing a loan 
to a consumer.  Id. § 1321.39. 
 136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.39(A). 
 137. Id. § 1321.40(A). 
 138. Id. § 1321.39.  Other prohibitions designed to address the debt trap include banning 
lenders from issuing more than four loans per year to a borrower, issuing a loan to a borrower for 
the purpose of retiring an outstanding payday loan between the borrower and lender (refinancing), 
and charging a fee to extend the loan’s maturity date (roll-over).  See id. § 1321.41(G), (K), (R). 
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new law by mounting a $20 million campaign to defeat the law through a voter 
initiative placed on the November 2008 ballot.139  In response, Ohio voters 
overwhelmingly defeated the industry’s initiative by a twenty-seven point 
margin.140 
After the defeat, payday lenders in Ohio started skirting the new law even 
before its effective date.141  According to a March 2009 study conducted by the 
Housing Research and Advocacy Center, only nineteen lenders had obtained a 
license under the new law.142  Because the Short-Term Loan Act only applies 
to businesses licensed under the Act and does not actually compel short-term 
lenders to obtain licenses under it,143 most lenders avoided getting licenses 
under the new law and obtained licenses under Ohio’s two more lenient 
lending laws: Ohio’s Mortgage Loan Act and the Small Loan Act.144  
Licensing under the Mortgage Loan Act is attractive because it does not 
require issuance of an actual mortgage, does not define the length of the loan 
term, and although it does cap APRs at 25%, the lender may charge various 
fees, effectively resulting in triple-digit APRs.145  Similarly, the Small Loan 
Act does not define the loan term and allows payday lenders to charge an 
effective APR of 423%, which is higher than the 391% allowed under the 
repealed payday-lending statute.146  Consequently, since the inception of the 
                                                            
 139. Editorial, End Loan Abuses, BLADE (Toledo, Ohio), May 2, 2010, at B6; James Nash & 
Jim Siegel, 2 Ballot Issues Cost $82 Million: Battle over Issues Was Priciest in Ohio’s History, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 2008, at A1, A4. 
 140. See Nash & Siegel, supra note 139, at A1, A4 (describing how the payday-loan industry 
spent millions in comparison to the thousands spent by consumer advocates); Thomas Suddes, 
Lender Loophole Isn’t Getting Fixed, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Aug. 23, 2009, at G1 
(stating that “legislators’ delay in closing loopholes in Ohio’s anti-payday-loan law” was a “key” 
example of the General Assembly’s failure to address pitfalls in legislation). 
 141. Payday lenders are similarly defying a new law in South Carolina.  See Warren Bolton, 
Editorial, Payday Lenders Are at It Again, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 3, 2010, at 6 (“Payday 
lenders were happy to operate under the law adopted expressly for them as long as there were no 
consumer protections . . . .”). 
 142. See JEFFREY DILLMAN ET AL., HOUS. RESEARCH & ADVOCACY CTR.,  THE NEW FACE 
OF PAYDAY LENDING IN OHIO 1 (2009), available at http://www.thehousingcenter.org 
/docman/Download-document/68-The-New-Face-of-Payday-Lending-in-Ohio-March-2009.html# 
storylink=misearch. 
 143. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.35–.36 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 144. See DILLMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 1. 
 145. See id. at 8–9. 
 146. Id. at 7–8.  Although the Small Loan Act provides for an interest-rate cap of 28% on 
loans under $1000, payday lenders can charge higher interest rates because the Small Loan Act’s 
definition of APR does not include any extra fees charged by the lender.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 1321.10(A)(10), 1321.13(A) (LexisNexis 2010).  Lenders under the Small Loan Act may 
charge origination fees of $15 for loans under $500, and $30 for loans over $500.  Id.  
§ 1321.13(I)(1)–(2).  The Act also allows lenders to charge $15 and $30 origination fees, 
respectively, on each refinancing made six months after the original loan.  Id.  Additionally, a 
licensee can contract for default charges for any payment not made within ten days after its due 
date.  Id. § 1321.13(K).  Because the Act does not limit the length of the loan, lenders can charge 
an APR of 423% on a fourteen-day, $100 loan.  See DILLMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 7–8. 
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Short-Term Loan Act, over 1000 payday lenders have obtained licenses under 
the other two acts, as opposed to the new law.147   
A September 2009 study by Policy Matters Ohio found that every payday 
lender surveyed continued to charge triple-digit interest rates and required loan 
repayment within two weeks or less, and most lenders issued loans in amounts 
exceeding $500.148  Many lenders are Internet-based and charge interest rates 
higher than, and issue loans in amounts greater than the brick-and-mortar 
stores.149  Each of these practices would violate Ohio’s new law had these 
lenders properly obtained licenses under the Act instead of circumventing the 
Act by operating under laws intended to regulate different businesses.150  In an 
unpublished opinion, an Ohio magistrate judge recently held that the Mortgage 
Loan Act did not cover a payday lender’s loan product, labeled as a “Short 
Term Financed Loan.”151  Because the lender was not licensed under the  
Short-Term Loan Act, it was only entitled to interest at a rate of 8%, not the 
triple-digit interest rate called for in the contract.152  The payday lender’s 
employee admitted that its operations were basically the same as when licensed 
as a “payday lender.”153  Because this decision does not have precedential 
value, the payday lenders in Ohio continue to violate state law.  Payday lenders 
in other states are also allowing their payday-lending licenses to expire and are 
instead getting licenses to operate under state laws not intended to cover their 
loan products.154  
The payday lending situation in Ohio and other states demonstrates that 
payday lenders can and will skirt state legislative efforts to curb predatory 
practices.155  If state regulators seek enforcement actions against them, payday 
lenders keep regulators tied up in protracted litigation that unnecessarily 
                                                            
 147. See DILLMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 3–5. 
 148. See DAVID ROTHSTEIN, POL’Y MATTERS OHIO, NEW LAW, SAME OLD LOANS: PAYDAY 
LENDERS SIDESTEP OHIO LAW 1–4 (2009), available at http://www.policymattersohio.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/NewLawSameOldLoans2009.pdf.  Despite multiple visits and calls 
to sixty-nine payday loan stores in Ohio, testers had trouble obtaining information about loan 
terms.  Id. at 2. 
 149. Id. at 4–5. 
 150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.39, 1321.41 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); ROTHSTEIN, 
supra note 148, at 2. 
 151. See Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, No. 09CVF01488, slip op. at 1 (Elyria Mun. 
Ct. Mar. 25, 2011). 
 152. Id. at 13–14. 
 153. Id. at 1. 
 154. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 131 (noting the high percentage of South 
Carolina payday lenders that let their licenses expire in order to obtain different licenses to make 
unsecured loans). 
 155. The exploitation of these loopholes has led to a proposed federal bill.  See Protecting 
Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates Act of 2009, S. 500, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
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diverts limited governmental resources.156  The CFPB is, therefore, an essential 
part of stopping the payday-loan industry’s flagrant violations of state laws.   
B.  Mainstream Financial Institutions Offer So-Called Direct-Deposit 
Advances 
Unlike non-bank payday lenders, traditional banks have no rules regulating 
their high-interest, short-term loans to civilian consumers;157 consequently, 
several banks now offer payday loans cleverly labeled “direct deposit 
advances.”158  As a condition for receiving the direct-deposit advance, a 
consumer must have a bank account with the lender-bank and must have his or 
her income check automatically deposited into that account each pay period.159  
These bank-issued loans are currently available in at least half of the states.160  
Because banks are seeking to replace revenues lost from legal restrictions on 
overdraft programs, analysts predict banks will promote their payday loans 
more aggresively.161  In the absence of legal restrictions on the terms of these 
bank-issued loans, they cannot be considered a safe, affordable alternative to 
non-bank payday loans.162  
1.  Payday Loans Disguised as Direct-Deposit Advances  
Bank-issued payday loans have triple-digit interest rates, short maturity 
dates, and single balloon payments.163  Major banks, including Fifth Third 
                                                            
 156. See, e.g., Jessica Legge Borders, Fight Against Internet Payday Lenders Continues, 
TIMES W. VIRGINIAN, Nov. 22, 2009, http://timeswv.com/business/x546416422/Fight-against-
Internet-payday-lenders-continues (“Since 2005, the Attorney General [of West Virginia] . . . has 
been aggressively fighting against Internet payday lenders and trying to enforce the law.”); 
Andrew DeMillo, Ark. AG Asks Payday Lenders to Shut Down or Face Lawsuits, S. BANCORP 
(Mar. 19, 2008), https://banksouthern.com/news/ark-ag-asks-payday-lenders-to-shut-down-or-
face-lawsuits/ (reporting Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel’s decision to shut down 
payday lending even though he expects payday lenders to fight in court for years). 
 157. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing a federal law imposing numerous 
restrictions on payday loans to active-duty military families, and noting that such restrictions are 
applicable to all financial institutions, not just non-banks). 
 158. See Chris Serres, Biggest Banks Stepping in to Payday Arena, STARTRIB., Sept. 6, 2009, 
at D1, D7; Ulam, supra note 25. 
 159. See Serres, supra note 158, at D7; see also David Lazarus, 120% Rate for Wells’ 
Advances, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2004, at C1. 
 160. See Ulam, supra note 25. 
 161. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 16 
(stating that “[t]he new limitations on overdrafts, which will require affirmative consumer opt-in 
for banks’ overdraft loan programs, will likely reduce banks’ overdraft fee revenues, perhaps by 
27% to 34%,” and, consequently, “[b]anks are likely to push customers toward bank account 
advance loans to replace this lost revenue”). 
 162. See Ulam, supra note 25. 
 163. See Letter from Adam Rust, Research Dir., Cmty. Reinvestment Ass’n of N.C., to the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1 (July 14, 2011), available at http://cra-
nc.org/sites/cra-nc.org/files/pdf/occ%20guidance%20comment2.pdf (describing how the banks’ 
direct deposit advances have the same characteristics as payday loans and lead to a similar cycle 
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Bank, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo, offer short-term loans that carry fees 
ranging from $7.50 to $10.00 for every $100.00 borrowed.164  The banks’ 
disclosures indicate that the maximum time a loan can remain unpaid is thirty-
five days; however, the loan amount and finance charge will be offset 
automatically against incoming direct deposits of greater than $100.165  
Because consumers typically are paid twice per month, this practice results in 
the repayment of the loan in fourteen days, which translates into an APR of 
261% or higher with a finance charge of $10 per $100.166  One study found 
that the term for a typical bank-issued payday loan is only ten days, which 
results in an APR of 365% for a $100 loan with a $10 finance charge, and that 
the borrower enters a cycle of debt for an average of 175 days.167  
Consequently, the bank’s direct-deposit loan product obligates the consumer to 
pay a high-cost loan in a single balloon payment in a short amount of time.168  
This process “forces most customers into a long-term cycle of borrowing that 
systematically strips them of their funds.”169   
Some banks claim to have policies preventing rollovers or renewals so as to 
distinguish their loans from non-bank payday loans.170  Although this may be 
technically true, consumers with account balances insufficient to cover both 
the automatic loan payment and checks drawn on the accounts incur overdraft 
fees, depriving them of money to cover other living expenses and forcing them 
to obtain numerous back-to-back loans.171  As one study found, borrowers 
                                                                                                                                         
of debt); see also Serres, supra note 158, at D7 (reporting how institutions issuing direct-deposit 
advances debit borrowers’ accounts as soon as the paychecks for the following pay period have 
been deposited). 
 164. See Serres, supra note 158, at D7; see also WELLS FARGO BANK, WELLS FARGO 
DIRECT DEPOSIT ADVANCE SERVICE AGREEMENT AND PRODUCT GUIDE 3 (2011) [hereinafter 
WELLS FARGO AGREEMENT], available at https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/checking 
/dda/termsandconditions_english.pdf. 
 165. See WELLS FARGO AGREEMENT, supra note 164, at 4 (stating that although “each 
advance must be repaid within 35 days, your advance may be repaid much sooner depending on 
the timing of your next [incoming] Qualified Deposit,” which is defined broadly to cover deposit 
sources such as paychecks and tax refunds (emphasis in original)). 
 166. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 16 (stating that although banks technically disclose 
an APR, it is grossly below the actual APR associated with the bank-issued loan); Serres, supra 
note 158, at D7 (“[C]ustomers can’t extend on ‘roll over’ the loans because the amount owed is 
automatically repaid with the next direct deposit.”). 
 167. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.  Although the APR on bank-issued loans are 
slightly lower than the APR on non-bank payday loans, the bank-issued loans carry late fees not 
charged by non-bank payday lenders.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY 
LOANS SPREADING, supra note 26, at 1. 
 168. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Serres, supra note 158, at D7 (discussing a Wells Fargo spokesperson’s statements 
claiming that the institution’s loan product differs from payday loans). 
 171. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; Randall & Zibel, supra note 27 (describing the 
story of an Ohio resident, who incurred so many bounced-check fees as a result of her lender’s 
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obtain, on average, sixteen bank-issued loans per year.172  Moreover, a Wells 
Fargo employee admitted that “[m]any [borrowers] fall into a recurring cycle 
of taking advances to pay off the previous advance taken.”173  Thus, if it 
quacks like a payday loan, then it is a payday loan.   
If the consumer’s direct deposit is too small to pay the loan in full, the 
bank’s automatic deduction for payment will lead to overdraft fees, thereby 
creating a need for an additional loan and worsening the consumer’s financial 
crisis.174  This cyclical process is especially prevalent among social-security 
recipients, who comprise a substantial percentage of the borrowers obtaining 
bank-issued payday loans.175  Banks access a large percentage of  
social-security recipients’ checks to pay off the loans.176  For example, a 
social-security recipient who applied for a direct-deposit advance from Wells 
Fargo ultimately obtained 24 loans in a 39-month period, paid $1200 in finance 
charges with effective APRs ranging from 182% to 1825%, and paid $676 in 
overdraft fees on loans marketed as a means of avoiding such fees.177  This 
example illustrates that bank-issued loans are arguably worse than regular 
payday loans because the bank’s automatic deduction process ensures priority 
over any other creditors178 and violates consumer-protection laws enacted to 
protect due-process rights and certain income sources from garnishment.179  
                                                                                                                                         
automated debits—despite the lender’s so-called procedures to forestall long-term use of the 
payday-loan and direct-deposit products—that she lost her bank account and is now unable to 
open another). 
 172. BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
 173. See Lazarus, supra note 159, at C8. 
 174. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 5 (“US Bank charges an overdraft fee 
when a customer is delinquent on their outstanding checking account . . . [and] puts any future 
payments towards the overdraft fee before satisfying the principal[,] . . . creating overdrafts.”). 
 175. BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 8 (“Nearly one-quarter of all bank payday borrowers 
are Social Security recipients, who are 2.6 times as likely to have used a bank payday loan as 
bank customers as a whole.” (footnote omitted)). 
 176. See id. (“[W]hen a Social Security recipient had an outstanding bank payday loan, the 
bank took a sizeable proportion (33 percent) of the borrower’s next deposit to repay the loan and 
fee.”). 
 177. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF  
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: PROPOSED GUIDANCE ON DEPOSIT-RELATED 
CONSUMER CREDIT PRODUCTS 19 (2011) [hereinafter CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC 
GUIDANCE], available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/ 
occ-comments-payday-overdraft.pdf. 
 178. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 25, at 3 (stating that regardless of the means by which U.S. 
Bank obtains repayment of its bank-issued loan, the loan “is paid before all other transactions are 
processed, including checks, preauthorized transfers and any other transactions”). 
 179. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 6; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 18–21 (asserting that banks violate the Social 
Security Act when they use a borrower’s direct deposit of a social-security check to pay off the 
payday loan, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act by requiring borrowers to authorize electronic 
debits to repay loans, and lending regulations by issuing loans without assessing a borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan). 
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2.  The OCC’s Guidance for Direct-Deposit Advances: A Possible Window 
Dressing 
With the limited exception of one federal law protecting military families 
from payday lending, no federal law exists that imposes restrictions on banks 
issuing payday loans to civilian consumers, and the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), the prudential regulator of national banks, is currently 
not inclined to regulate bank-issued payday loans.180  
 Before entering directly into the payday-loan market, some banks were 
involved behind the scene for several years and provided billions of dollars to 
finance the operations of non-bank payday lenders.181  This financing enabled 
the payday-loan industry to borrow at a rate of 3.3% while charging consumers 
an average APR of 455%.182  Some national banks entered into partnerships 
with payday lenders, commonly known as rent-a-banks, so that the non-bank 
payday lenders could use the doctrine of federal preemption available to 
national banks to avoid compliance with state laws capping interest rates on 
payday loans.183  After urging by consumer advocacy groups, the OCC put a 
stop to rent-a-bank partnerships because of concerns that payday lending posed 
risks to the safety and soundness of banks and risks to consumers.184  In 2000, 
an OCC advisory letter regarding payday lending recognized that “payday 
lending carries significant credit, transaction, reputation, and compliance and 
                                                            
 180. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 
109-364, sec. 670, § 987, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)); 
Limitations on Terms of Consumer Credit Extended to Service Members and Dependents, 32 
C.F.R. § 232.1 (2009).  These laws and regulations apply to all financial institutions offering 
loans that meet their definition of a payday loan.  See 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(e) (defining a creditor as 
“a person who is engaged in the business of extending consumer credit with respect to a 
consumer credit transaction covered by this part”).  However, because the Act defines a payday 
loan as a closed-end credit product, 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(b)(1)(i), some banks circumvent this 
definition by claiming that their direct-deposit advances are open-ended credit products.  CRL  
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 21.  The OCC originally took the 
position that payday lending was unacceptable among banks.  See id. at 27 (urging the OCC not 
to adopt guidelines proposed in 2011 that would legitimize triple-digit APRs on loans issued by 
banks); Andrew Kahr, New Loan Type Will Force New Limits, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 2010, at 9 
(reporting on an OCC statement from years ago, which asserts that “payday lending is not an 
appropriate activity for a national bank”). 
 181. See KEVIN CONNOR & MATTHEW SKOMAROVSKY, NAT’L PEOPLE’S ACTION & PUB. 
ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE, THE PREDATORS’ CREDITORS: HOW THE BIGGEST BANKS ARE 
BANKROLLING THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 18–19 (2010), available at 
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2010/09/14/19/paydayreport_FINAL.source.prod_affiliate.
56.pdf. 
 182. Id. at 19. 
 183. See CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 8. 
 184. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER AL 
2000-10, PAYDAY LENDING 3 (2000) [hereinafter OCC ADVISORY LETTER], available  
at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2000/advisory-letter-2000-
10.pdf. 
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legal risks that raise supervisory concerns.”185  In 2003, then-Comptroller John 
D. Hawke Jr. told payday lenders to “[s]tay the hell away from national banks” 
when explaining the OCC’s enforcement action against Peoples National Bank 
for its rent-a-bank partnership in South Carolina.186 
In a remarkable flip-flop, the OCC, under different leadership, has ignored 
its previous guidance addressing payday loans and proposed new guidelines 
that would allow national banks to continue offering their own versions  
of payday loans.187  The OCC’s 2011 proposed guidelines regarding  
direct-deposit advances avoid the “payday loan” term and are vague on many 
of the payday-loan characteristics that are considered predatory.188  For 
example, although the OCC is aware that payday lending leads to multiple 
rollovers or back-to-back loans, the OCC’s guidance states only that 
“[d]eposit-related credit products should be subject to prudent limitations on 
credit extensions, customer costs, and usage.”189  Incredibly, the OCC fails to 
provide examples of “prudent limitations;”190 thus banks like Wells Fargo 
would be free to interpret the rules to allow consumers to obtain multiple back-
to-back loans.191  Because the OCC’s guidelines are indefinite and leave 
untouched many of the payday-loan characteristics that are considered 
predatory, they may be a mere window dressing designed to legitimize  
bank-issued payday loans.192  The OCC’s actions are particularly unfortunate 
for consumers because bank-issued payday loans and regular payday loans are 
                                                            
 185. Id. 
 186. See Ben Jackson, OCC Payday Purge Done; Lenders Eye State Banks, AM. BANKER, 
Feb. 3, 2003, at 1 (identifying several banks that the OCC ordered to sever their partnerships with 
payday lenders). 
 187. Compare OCC ADVISORY LETTER, supra note 184, at 1–8 (describing the risks 
associated with bank payday lending), and CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, 
supra note 177, at 4–8 (critiquing the proposed OCC guidance and recommending heightened 
restrictions), and Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 1–10, with Guidance on Deposit-
Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,409, 33,410–13 (proposed June 8, 2011) 
(detailing the OCC’s proposed guidance).  See also Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection 
After the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Hous.,  
& Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 21–22 (2011) (written testimony of Michael D. Calhoun, President, 
Ctr. for Responsible Lending), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm 
?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=1980c90b-c8f9-4278-b509-d9de43e8506a& 
Witness_ID=3cb65047-012f-4110-991a-ec0463ae648d  (stating that the “OCC recently proposed 
weak guidance addressing the bank[-issued] payday loans”). 
 188. See Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed. Reg. at  
33,409–13; see also Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 2 (criticizing the guidelines as 
being “too vague”). 
 189. See Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,410. 
 190. Id.; Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 6. 
 191. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text. 
 192. See CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 23 (criticizing 
the “high degree of flexibility” included in the OCC’s guidance); see also BORNÉ ET AL., supra 
note 16, at 12 (“[T]he OCC proposed guidance on payday lending that accepts many current bank 
practices and essentially condones the most harmful aspects of the product . . . .”). 
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practical equivalents.193  Additionally, the OCC requested written comments 
on its proposed guidance less than forty-five days before the day the CFPB 
became operational.194  Critics rightfully question the timing of the OCC’s 
guidelines as an attempt to stealthily usurp rulemaking authority from the 
CFPB.195  
III.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
When President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law and established 
the CFPB, he remarked that “our financial system only works—our market is 
only free—when there are clear rules and basic safeguards that prevent abuse, 
that check excess, that ensure that it is more profitable to play by the rules than 
to game the system.”196   
President Obama’s remarks are clearly applicable to payday loans.  As 
explained in Part II, regular non-bank payday lenders are constantly gaming 
the system; that is, circumventing state laws intended to regulate their loan 
products.197  In addition, mainstream banks are now players in the payday-loan 
business and are subject to only vague guidelines the banks could choose to 
ignore.198  Although credit unions have a reputation comparable to a trusted 
uncle from whom one could obtain a loan,199 some credit unions have been 
accused of offering high-cost loans similar to regular payday loans.200  A rule 
recently adopted by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) sets a 
28% APR cap on short-term loans offered by federal credit unions and imposes 
other lending restrictions as well.201  Despite the NCUA’s rule, however, 
circulating media reports document some credit unions charging excessive 
                                                            
 193. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 1; see also supra Part II.B.1. 
 194. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 1. 
 195. Id. at 1, 5.  The Dodd-Frank Act explicitly transfers “[a]ll consumer financial protection 
functions of the Comptroller of the Currency” to the CFPB.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.  
111-203, § 1061(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2036 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5581 
(Supp. IV 2010)); see also id. § 1061(a)(1)(A) (defining “consumer financial protection 
functions” as “all authority to prescribe rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal 
consumer financial law, including performing appropriate functions to promulgate and review 
such rules, orders, and guidelines”). 
 196. William D. Cohan, Op-Ed., Make Wall Street Risk It All, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at 
A27. 
 197. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 198. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 199. See Frank J. Diekmann, The Agenda Item You Won’t Find on the Agenda, CREDIT 
UNION J., June 27, 2011, at 6 (discussing which credit unions act morally and responsibly and 
which have suffered a “moral lapse” as result of their so-called alternatives to payday loans); Ben 
Hallman, More Credit Unions Offering Payday Loans, WASH. POST, May 31, 2011, at A8 
(reporting that credit unions traditionally offer “prudent loans . . . without the profit motive of 
traditional banks”). 
 200. See, e.g., Hallman, supra note 199, at A8 (reporting that Mountain American Federal 
Credit Union and other credit unions offered loans with triple-digit interest rates). 
 201. See 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii) (2011). 
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application fees disguised as finance charges, which cause the loans to have 
effective APRs in excess of 100%.202  Thus, the current financial landscape for 
payday loans demonstrates that many market participants play by their own 
rules and that “competition” among them has not resulted in the widespread 
availability of reasonably priced loans to consumers.203  Consequently, the 
CFPB needs to exercise its regulatory authority and intervene.  
The Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA)—Title X of the  
Dodd-Frank Act—establishes several objectives for the CFPB,204 and this 
section focuses on two: (1) to exercise its authority under federal  
consumer-protection laws to ensure consumers are protected from unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices; and (2) to ensure such laws are 
enforced consistently, without regard to the status of a depository institution, to 
promote fair competition.205  This section asserts that the CFPB can declare 
predatory characteristics of payday loans to be unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive, and thereby federally regulate payday lending to afford consumers 
basic protections from payday loans, regardless of which type of financial 
institution issues them.206 
A.  The Scope of the CFPB’s Authority over Financial Institutions 
The CFPB’s purpose is to “seek to implement and, where applicable, enforce 
Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring [1] 
that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and 
services and [2] that markets for consumer financial products and services are 
fair, transparent, and competitive.”207  The CFPB’s jurisdiction under the Act 
is over only a “covered person,” which includes both non-bank payday lenders 
and traditional financial institutions like banks and credit unions so long as 
                                                            
 202. See, e.g., Diekmann, supra note 199, at 6; Hallman, supra note 199, at A8. 
 203. See Hallman, supra note 199, at A8. 
 204. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1001, 1021(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964, 1980 
(2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5511 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 205. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021(b)(2), (4). 
 206. See infra Part III.A–D. 
 207. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021(a).  Under Title X, the CFPB’s enumerated primary functions 
are: 
(1) conducting financial education programs; (2) collecting, investigating, and 
responding to consumer complaints; (3) collecting, researching, monitoring, and 
publishing information relevant to the functioning of markets for consumer financial 
products and services to identify risks to consumers and the proper functioning of such 
markets; (4) subject to sections 1024 through 1026, supervising covered persons for 
compliance with Federal consumer financial law, and taking appropriate enforcement 
action to address violations of Federal consumer financial law; (5) issuing rules, orders, 
and guidance implementing Federal consumer financial law; and (6) performing such 
support activities as may be necessary or useful to facilitate the other functions of the 
Bureau. 
Id. § 1021(c)(1)–(6). 
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they “engage in offering or providing a consumer financial product or 
service.”208  
Although the CFPB has exclusive rulemaking authority with respect to all 
financial institutions offering payday loans,209 its actual authority to enforce its 
promulgated rules is dependent on the kind of financial institution.  The CFPB 
has examination and primary enforcement authority over large financial 
institutions (LFIs)—banks, credit unions, and savings and loan  
associations—with assets exceeding $10 billion.210  However, the CFPB has 
the authority only to accompany prudential regulators on examinations of 
financial institutions with $10 billion or less in total assets—smaller financial 
institutions (SFIs).211  In other words, the prudential regulators of the SFIs still 
have primary responsibility for examining the SFIs and exclusive authority to 
enforce their compliance with consumer-protection laws and regulations.212  
As for the typical non-bank payday lender, the CFPB has rulemaking, 
examination, supervisory, and enforcement authority over any non-depository 
covered person that “offers or provides to a consumer a payday loan.”213  
Based on the foregoing, the CFPB has broad enforcement authority over 
non-banks engaged in payday lending, as well as primary enforcement 
authority over LFIs offering payday loans.214  Unfortunately, the CFPB has no 
enforcement authority over SFIs like the credit unions that are allegedly now 
offering high-priced loans;215 therefore, it is likely to encounter opposition in 
affording consumers protection from payday lending.  Nevertheless, because 
the CFPB has rulemaking authority over all financial institutions216 and has the 
ability to recommend best practices to the FDIC, NCUA, and other prudential 
                                                            
 208. See id. § 1002(6)(A)–(B). 
 209. See id. § 1022(b)(4)(A). 
 210. See id. § 1025(a)–(b); id. § 1025(b)(1)(A)–(C) (granting the CFPB “exclusive authority 
to require reports and conduct examinations on a periodic basis” of LFIs for several purposes, 
including “detecting and assessing associated risks to consumers and to markets for consumer 
financial products and services”); id. § 1025(c)(1) (“To the extent that the Bureau and another 
Federal agency are authorized to enforce a Federal consumer financial law, the Bureau shall have 
primary authority to enforce that Federal consumer financial law.”); see also id. § 1002(a)(24) 
(identifying the FDIC as the prudential regulator for insured depository institutions and the 
NCUA as the prudential regulator for insured credit unions). 
 211. See id. § 1026(a); id. § 1026(d)(1) (“Except for requiring reports under subsection (b), 
the prudential regulator is authorized to enforce the requirements of Federal consumer financial 
laws and, with respect to a covered person described in subsection (a), shall have exclusive 
authority (relative to the Bureau) to enforce such laws.”). 
 212. See id. § 1026(d)(1). 
 213. See id. § 1024(a)(1)(E), (c)(1). 
 214. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text. 
 215. See, e.g., Hallman, supra note 199, at A8. 
 216. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(h)(4)(A). 
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regulators of the SFIs,217 the CFPB should encourage these regulators to force 
SFIs to comply with the CFPB’s regulations.218    
The CFPB is specifically authorized to issue “rules, orders, and guidance 
implementing Federal consumer financial laws.”219  The CFPB’s rulemaking 
authority is exclusive;220 however, it shares part of that authority with the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).221  The CFPA mandates that courts afford 
deference to the CFPB with respect to “the meaning or interpretation of any 
provision of a Federal consumer financial law” as though “the  
[CFPB] . . . were the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret or 
administer the provisions of such Federal consumer financial law.”222 
Although courts must defer to the CFPB’s interpretations, the CFPA 
imposes some constraints on the CFPB’s rulemaking authority.223  First, the 
CFPA obliges the CFPB to consult with the “appropriate prudential regulators 
or other Federal agencies prior to proposing a rule” and release any of their 
objections.224  Second, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can 
veto, by a two-thirds majority vote, any CFPB regulation that “would put the 
safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the 
financial system of the United States at risk.”225  These constraints, however, 
should not deter the CFPB from exercising its authority to regulate payday 
lending by prohibiting the worst payday-loan practices.  
B.  The CFPB Has Rulemaking Authority to Define Payday Loans and Covered 
Persons 
The CFPB first and foremost must use its rulemaking authority to define a 
“payday loan.”226  Although the definition appearing in an earlier draft of the 
Dodd-Frank Act was ultimately eliminated,227 the Act unquestionably covers 
                                                            
 217. Id. §§ 1002(a)(24), 1024. 
 218. See id. § 1026(d)(2)(A) (“When the Bureau has reason to believe that a person described 
in subsection (a) has engaged in a material violation of a Federal consumer financial law, the 
Bureau shall notify the prudential regulator in writing and recommend appropriate action to 
respond.”). 
 219. Id. § 1021(c)(5). 
 220. See id. § 1022(b)(4)(A). 
 221. See id. § 1061(a)(5). 
 222. Id. § 1022(b)(4)(B). 
 223. Id. § 1022(b)(2). 
 224. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(B)–(C).  The CFPB must release any written objections submitted in 
opposition to the proposed regulation and its response to the objection.  Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C). 
 225. Id. § 1023(a). 
 226. The author argues in another forthcoming law review article that the CFPB should 
establish guidelines for safe, affordable loans and eliminate using the words “payday loans” as 
they have become synonymous with predatory credit transactions. 
 227. See Payday Loan Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 2871, 110th Cong. sec. 2, § 128(e)(2)(B) 
(2007) (defining a “payday loan” as “a small cash advance . . . made” in exchange for “(A) the 
personal check or share draft of the consumer, in the amount of the advance plus a fee, where 
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the typical payday loan, as well as any purported “nonfinancial good or service 
[that] is done as a subterfuge, so as to evade or circumvent the provisions of” 
the Act.228  In crafting an explicit definition, the CFPB should look to other 
definitions of payday loans to avoid making the definition too narrow.  For 
example, Illinois initially defined a payday loan as a loan with a 120-day loan 
period; however, the definition was ineffective because payday lenders simply 
expanded the loan maturity date by one day to skirt the usury cap.229  
Similarly, Congress passed a law—commonly referred to as the Military 
Lending Act—to protect active-duty soldiers and their families from payday 
lending.230  The law defines a payday loan as a closed-end credit transaction 
with a term of ninety-one days or less and an amount no greater than $2,000.231  
As explained previously, many non-bank payday lenders and, in particular, 
bank-issued direct-deposit advances have abandoned contractual language 
identifying their loans as closed-end credit and now claim to offer open-ended 
credit.232 Because these open-ended loans often result in multiple back-to-back 
loans for the consumer, they function just like regular payday loans233 and, 
therefore, should be included in the CFPB’s definition of a payday loan.  
This Article does not aim to recommend a precise definition; rather, it 
recommends that the CFPB should broaden the payday-loan definition to 
include payday loans having the semblance of another loan product.234  In 
broad terms, a payday-loan definition should acknowledge that the loan is an 
                                                                                                                                         
presentment or negotiation of such check or share draft is deferred by agreement of the parties 
until a designated future date; or (B) the authorization of the consumer to debit the transaction 
account or share draft account of the consumer, in the amount of the advance plus a fee, where 
such account will be debited on or after a designated future date”). 
 228. Dodd-Frank Act § 1027(a)(B)(ii). 
 229. See Stephen Franklin, Interest Still High in Payday Battle, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2008,  
§ 5 (Business), at 1 (reporting that payday lenders exploited the loophole by issuing loans for a 
term of 121 days and calling them installment loans). 
 230. See John Warner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 
sec. 670, § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) 
(2006)). 
 231. See 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(b)(1)(i) (2011). 
 232. See CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 21 (explaining 
how banks call their loans open-ended credit to circumvent the Military Lending Act’s (MLA) 
definition of payday loan for the purpose of issuing high-cost loans to military personnel); see 
also BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 12 (asserting that by structuring their loans as open-ended 
credit, banks “undermine[] federal law aimed at protecting military service members”); supra 
notes 31, 95–97, 180 and accompanying text (explaining that the MLA imposes restrictions on  
bank-issued payday loans to military families if the loans meet the MLA’s definition of payday 
loan). 
 233. See, e.g., supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text (describing how a social-security 
recipient’s initial direct-deposit advance (a bank-issued payday loan) caused him to obtain 24 of 
these loans in a 39-month period). 
 234. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing how non-bank lenders tweak their loans to evade state 
law restrictions on payday loans). 
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unsecured,235 small-dollar loan of $3000 or less and should not distinguish 
between closed-end and open-ended terms.  If the definition must have a 
maturity period, the CFPB should regulate all loans with a one-year term or 
less, because many consumers may become trapped in long-term payday-loan 
debt cycles for several months.236   
The CFPB’s “payday loan” definition should also identify all known 
subterfuges, regardless of lenders’ clever labeling.  This will help counteract 
the amply evidenced practice of lenders disguising payday loans as other 
products and services.237  The CFPB should also draft language, such as 
“including, but not limited to,” to appear at the beginning of the subterfuge list.  
Such language enables courts to encompass within the CFPB’s regulation any 
future subterfuge used by lenders to dodge state or federal regulations. 
In addition to defining payday loans, the CFPB should exercise its authority 
to expand the definition of a “covered person”238 to include companies 
pretending to be some other type of entity, such as a financial thrift institution 
or a tribal partnership.239  For example, an investigation into the Oklahoma 
Tribe of Miami, which claimed to operate payday-lending businesses as 
economic tribal subdivisions, revealed an empty warehouse at the businesses’ 
address.240  Such payday lenders with only a tangential connection to Native 
American tribes should be identified as a “covered person.”241  If the CFPB 
fails to expand the scope of covered persons, more payday lenders will form 
nominal tribal partnerships and continue to offer loans in violation of state 
laws.242   
                                                            
 235. The loan would be considered unsecured even if the lender claims as collateral a  
post-dated check, instrument, property worth little value, or property the lender would never 
repossess. 
 236. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 237. See, e.g., Short On Cash.Net of New Castle, Inc. v. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 811 N.E.2d 819, 
826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (enjoining a purported Internet service provider’s operations and finding 
its sale of bimonthly one-hour web access to be a disguised payday loan in violation of state usury 
law); Johnson, supra note 34, at 18–20 (discussing payday loans disguised as a “sale-lease-back” 
transaction or “catalog sale”); see also supra Part II.A–B. 
 238. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1024(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1987 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)) (“The Bureau shall consult with 
the Federal Trade Commission prior to issuing a rule . . . to define covered persons subject to this 
section.”). 
 239. See supra Part II.A.2–4. 
 240. Hudson & Heath, supra note 114. 
 241. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 242. Furthermore, because the CFPB has examination authority over non-banks, Dodd-Frank 
Act § 1024(d), it should investigate companies claiming tribal immunity. 
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C.  The CFPB Can Declare Many Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Deceptive, 
or Abusive 
After expanding the definitions of payday loans and covered persons, the 
CFPB should prescribe rules that make common payday-loan terms and 
practices unlawful.243  The CFPB has explicit authority under the CFPA to 
identify as unlawful any act or practice that is “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” in 
connection with a consumer financial product or service.244  This statutory 
authority is similar to the FTC’s authority to prohibit unfair and deceptive acts 
or practices;245 however, the FTC’s statute does not mention authority to 
proscribe “abusive” practices.246   
This section discusses payday-loan practices that the CFPA should deem 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive, respectively, and the bases for such 
determinations.  
1.  Unfair Practices Inflict Substantial Injury 
The CFPA should identify certain “unfair” payday-lending practices as 
unlawful. The CFPA imports the standard for unfairness from the law 
governing the FTC.247  When the CFPB has a reasonable basis, it may declare 
an act or practice to be unfair if the act causes the consumer substantial and 
reasonably unavoidable injury that is not outweighed by any countervailing 
benefits to the consumer.248  The data clearly support the conclusion that high 
interest rates, short maturity dates, single balloon payments, multiple rollover 
or refinancing fees, and repetitive electronic bank-account access substantially 
injure some consumers and that the economic injury caused by these practices 
outweighs any benefits to consumers.249  Multiple studies show that triple-digit 
interest rates, often in violation of state law, cost consumers millions of 
dollars.250  Moreover, most consumers are unable to repay the loans in a short 
                                                            
 243. See id. § 1022(b)(1). 
 244. Id. § 1031(b) (“The Bureau may prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or 
service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in 
connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or 
the offering of a consumer financial product or service.  Rules under this section may include 
requirements for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices.”). 
 245. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006). 
 246. Compare id., with Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a). 
 247. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(n), with Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c). 
 248. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c)(1)(A)–(B).  The CFPB may also consider public policy in 
determining fairness.  Id. § 1031(c)(2). 
 249. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I. 
 250. See, e.g., ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 3 (estimating that payday lenders 
collected nearly $6 million in fees from Minnesotans, which was in violation of state law); 
PARRISH & KING, supra note 66, at 13 (finding that “churning” accounts for $3.5 billion in fees); 
Martin, supra note 37, at 885–91 (describing how lenders subvert state laws in order to charge 
higher APRs). 
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period, usually two weeks, as required under their contracts,251 and must resort 
to paying multiple rollover fees or obtaining several successive loans.252  
Recall the earlier, illustrative example of Bonnie Bernhardt, whose bank 
account was debited nine times to obtain more than $800 in refinancing fees 
for a mere $300 loan.253  The harm caused by these practices substantially 
outweighs any potential benefit. 
Furthermore, the lenders’ use of repeated debits or demand drafts to 
withdraw funds from the borrowers’ bank accounts worsens the borrowers’ 
economic injury by depleting account funds needed to pay bills and by 
triggering NSF or overdraft fees for consumers with insufficient account 
balances.254  Consumer advocates maintain that federal regulators have largely 
turned a blind eye to this practice,255 which is often carried out through 
contract terms that would likely confuse the average consumer and are in 
violation of state consumer-protection statutes.256  In states that ban rollovers, 
some lenders induce consumers to obtain multiple consecutive loans, crafted as 
a means of collecting additional fees on the original loan.257  Some lenders also 
structure loans that automatically deduct from the borrower’s bank account 
only a rollover or refinancing fee, unless the borrower takes additional steps to 
                                                            
 251. See supra Part I.B.  A report prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense found that 
“75% of payday customers are unable to repay [the entire] loan within two weeks and are forced 
to get a loan ‘rollover’ at additional cost.”  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY 
LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 
14 (2006) [hereinafter DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_to_congress_final.pdf. 
 252. See, e.g., DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 30 (finding that 
since August 2001, slightly over $2.5 million has been provided to service members experiencing 
financial crises due to payday-loan debt traps). 
 253. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 47–59 and accompanying text; see also PARRISH & KING, supra note 
66, at 12–13 (stating that that multiple back-to-back loans cost borrowers $3.5 billion in fees 
annually). 
 255. See, e.g., Community and Consumer Advocates’ Perspectives on the Obama 
Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 111th Cong. 108 (2009) [hereinafter Consumer Advocates’ Perspective Hearing] 
(testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (“The 
Federal Reserve has supported the position of payday lenders and telemarketing fraud artists by 
permitting remotely created checks (demand drafts) to subvert consumer rights under the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act.”). 
 256. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 92 (testimony of 
Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America).  One contract stated, 
“While you may revoke the authorization to effect ACH debit entries at any time up to 3 business 
days prior to the due date, you may not revoke the authorization to prepare and submit checks on 
your behalf until such time as the loan is paid in full.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 257. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text; see also Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc., 708 
S.E.2d 871, 874 (Va. 2011) (finding that this practice is equivalent to a renewal or refinancing, 
which are prohibited). 
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pay off the loan in full.258  Consequently, many payday-loan borrowers end up 
financially worse off after having obtained the payday loan and, therefore, 
suffer substantial economic injury.259   
The financial injury from payday loans is particularly acute in African 
American and Latino communities.  One California study found that “[p]ayday 
lenders are nearly eight times as concentrated in neighborhoods with the 
largest shares of African Americans and Latinos as compared to white 
neighborhoods, draining nearly $247 million in fees per year from these 
communities.”260  Similarly, when the loans are bank-issued payday loans, the 
financial injury to senior citizens dependent on social-security benefits is acute 
because the banks take a large portion of their check to repay the loans.261 
Accordingly, because the above-mentioned payday-loan practices worsen the 
consumer’s financial condition, the substantial injuries arising from them are 
not outweighed by any potential benefits to the consumer.  
Although the prongs of “substantial injury” and “not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits” are evident, the debatable prong of the unfairness test 
is whether the financial injury arising from major payday-loan practices is 
reasonably unavoidable.262  An injury is not reasonably avoidable if consumers 
lack any “free and informed choice” enabling them to avoid the unfair 
                                                            
 258. DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 16; see supra notes 60–63 
and accompanying text (discussing the example of Ms. Bernhardt’s experience with this practice). 
 259. 151 CONG. REC. E1386 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Luis Gutierrez) 
(“[M]any who turn to these payday loan outlets end up far worse off than before.” (emphasis 
added)); see supra notes 71–83 and accompanying text (discussing the financial hardships 
resulting from payday lending). 
 260. WEI LI ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PREDATORY PROFILING: THE ROLE 
OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LOCATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN CALIFORNIA 10 (2009), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-payday/research-analysis/predatory-
profiling.pdf (“When [the authors] compare[d] the neighborhoods with the highest and lowest 
shares of African Americans and Latinos, [the authors found] that African American and Latino 
neighborhoods have a 2.4 times greater concentration of payday lending storefronts.”); see also 
Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target 
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 166 (2010) (describing the 
prevalence of various predatory loan products in communities of color and identifying specific 
ways in which corporate America uses individual minorities to target communities of color with 
these loan products). 
 261. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 8 (finding that banks deducted an average of 33% 
of a social-security recipient’s next deposit to repay the bank-issued loan).  Gender disparity is 
also at play in payday lending.  A recent study of payday lending in Texas reported that women, 
and in particular single women and single mothers, comprise the majority of Texas payday 
borrowers.  TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 13–14 (implying that Texas provides a snapshot 
of the typical payday borrower because “Texas is the source of 60% of the annual profits reported 
nationwide by the four largest publicly traded companies offering payday loans”). 
 262. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV 2010)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) (declaring that 
“unfair” practices are those that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”). 
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practice.263  The unavoidable-injury prong is not interpreted conservatively.264  
The FTC and the courts have held that this prong of the unfairness test does not 
mean that an injury is avoidable just because the consumer could have chosen 
not to enter into the contract or that the consumer could have chosen to do 
business with a competitor; rather, the consumer must have a basis to 
anticipate the financial harm.265  Before entering into a payday-loan contract, 
average consumers have no reason to anticipate that their payment of fees for 
due-date extensions will not count towards reducing the principal on the loan 
because all other forms of traditional consumer credit allow for partial 
payments that reduce some portion of the principal.266  Moreover, average 
consumers have no reason to anticipate that lenders will repeatedly debit their 
bank accounts, thereby triggering multiple overdraft or NSF fees for those with 
extremely low balances.267  Additionally, consumers with some money in their 
account have no reason to anticipate that lenders will debit the accounts 
repeatedly to collect only rollover fees, thereby depleting funds needed to pay 
other bills and forcing consumers to figure out how to pay off the entire loan or 
how to take extra steps to close their bank accounts so the debits will cease.  
Finally, consumers, at the time of contracting, have no reason to anticipate that 
banks may allow their accounts to become zombie accounts, allowing 
withdrawals even after consumers have officially closed their accounts.268  
Because consumers have no reason to anticipate harm from the foregoing 
lending practices, the financial injury from these payday-lending practices are 
therefore reasonably unavoidable.269   
Even if the unavoidable-injury prong is interpreted conservatively, the CFPB 
has several reasons to conclude that such free and informed choice is lacking 
and, therefore, the injury arising from the six major payday-loan practices270 is 
not reasonably avoidable.  For one, the payday loan industry and borrowers 
                                                            
 263. See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (citing FTC v. J.K. 
Publ’ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 264. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES  
251–52 (7th ed. 2008) (discussing the unavoidable-injury standard and providing examples of 
companies’ common arguments that have been rejected by courts and the FTC). 
 265. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 1988); Orkin 
Exteriminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 266 (1986) (“Consumers may act to avoid injury before it 
occurs if they have reason to anticipate the impending harm and the means to avoid it.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 266. See infra notes 304–06 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 269. Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. at 263 (“Whether some consequence is 
‘reasonably avoidable’ depends, not just on whether people know the physical steps to take in 
order to prevent it, but also on whether they understand the necessity of actually taking those 
steps.”). 
 270. The six practices include the following: (1) usurious interest rates; (2) short maturity 
dates; (3) single balloon payments; (4) multiple rollover or refinancing fees; (5) multiple  
back-to-back loans; and (6) repetitive electronic bank-account access. 
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admit that the loans cater to people with no other choice to resolve unexpected 
monetary shortages.271  Furthermore, many borrowers admit that they do not 
understand the APR associated with payday lending or the risks arising from 
defaulting on quickly approaching loan-repayment dates.272  The lack of choice 
is understandable given the ubiquitous presence of payday lenders in low-
income and minority neighborhoods,273 the dearth of mainstream financial 
institutions in these neighborhoods,274 the millions of dollars spent on 
advertising by payday lenders,275 and the consumers’ urgent need for 
immediate cash.276   
One might argue that borrowers could obtain a loan from a credit union, ask 
their creditors for time extensions on payments, or seek the assistance of a 
consumer credit-counseling agency.277  These possible options have 
weaknesses and may be largely theoretical for payday borrowers. The 
“reasonably avoidable” determination depends on whether consumers are 
                                                            
 271. See, e.g., Carrie Dann, Group Says Payday Lenders Spent $2.1M Lobbying in 2008, 
NAT’L J. (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/group-says-payday-
lenders-spent-2-1m-lobbying-in-2008-20090424, available at 2009 WLNR 7767921; Mediha 
Fejzagic DiMartino, Debt’s Vicious Cycle, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL. (Ontario, Cal.) (Apr. 2, 
2011, 6:35 AM), http://www.dailybulletin.com/ci_17758730?source=most_viewed (interviewing 
customers at a payday-loan store who “admitted no other options were available to address their 
monthly financial obligations”). 
 272. See DiMartino, supra note 271 (reporting that California borrowers “are aware of the 
fees associated with payday loans, but they do not understand the [APR] that is associated with 
long-term borrowing”); see also Martin, supra note 37, at 611–12 (reporting that a borrower, 
acting on her mother’s advice, opted for a payday loan, rather than a student loan, even though 
student loans have APRs between 0% and 8.5%). 
 273. See LI ET AL., supra note 260, at 10; see also TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 19 
(finding that payday-loan and car-title stores greatly outnumber traditional lenders in one of the 
poorest neighborhoods in Houston, Texas and suggesting that consumers may use these lenders 
because of “aggressive advertising and plentiful payday and auto title loan store locations,” rather 
than the “capacity of a payday or auto title loan to meet borrower needs”). 
 274. See TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 19; LI ET AL., supra note 260, at 10. 
 275. See, e.g., TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 19; Jim DuPlessis, Industry Tightens Rules 
in an Attempt to Head Off Regulation, Lenders to Tout Education, Limit Ads, STATE (Columbia, 
S.C.), Feb. 22, 2007, at C8, available at 2007 WLNR 3434932 (reporting that payday lenders 
budgeted $10 million for their publicity blitz). 
 276. See, e.g., Kevin Flowers, Payday Lenders Targeted, ERIE TIMES-NEWS (Pa.), Apr. 2, 
2006, at 1 (reporting that payday lenders “often prey[] on low-income and minority borrowers, 
who may have few other options when they desperately need money” and that they are “prevalent 
in minority neighborhoods”); Jake Lewis, Taming the Banking Predators, MULTINAT’L 
MONITOR, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 27, 28 (“Predatory lenders use door-to-door solicitations, phone 
calls and mailings to badger homeowners into refinancing their existing loans to obtain cash.  
This is a tempting idea for families on low and moderate incomes and strapped for cash, but an 
expensive remedy laced with high interest charges and fees which ultimately strip away what 
little equity remains in the house.”). 
 277. See Martin, supra note 37, at 612–13 (discussing alternatives to payday loans). 
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knowledgeable about what options they can exercise to avoid the harm.278  One 
poll shows that many high school students do not even know about the 
existence of credit unions, let alone the membership-eligibility requirements.279  
The general public’s lack of knowledge may be attributed to credit unions’ 
traditional practice of restricting memberships to people employed in a limited 
number of professions, which excluded many Americans from credit-union 
services.280  For consumers who are aware of their eligibility to join a credit 
union, some may not (1) qualify for a loan; (2) find credit unions that offer 
low-cost loans; or (3) secure a loan in enough time to deal with the financial 
crisis.   
Consumers could try negotiating with a creditor directly or seek the 
assistance of a credit counselor.  Generally, creditors do not have a good 
reputation for being willing to work with consumers who are unable to pay 
their debts.281  Credit counselors are willing to work with consumers, but they 
are limited in what they can accomplish for consumers because they only 
handle unsecured debt and primarily credit-card debt.282  Moreover, a 
consumer may not find a legitimate counselor in sufficient time to handle the 
financial crisis.  Because the credit-counseling industry is rife with for-profit 
companies known for scamming consumers, some consumers will get 
defrauded because they are unable to ascertain the legitimacy of such 
counselors.283  
                                                            
 278. Cf. Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1066 (1984) (noting that knowledge of the steps 
for avoiding injury is not enough for the injury to be reasonably avoidable; rather, the consumer 
must also understand and appreciate the necessity of taking those steps). 
 279. See, e.g., Poll: Only 15% of H.S. Students Aware of CU Difference, CUNA (June 24, 
2011), http://www.cuna.org/newsnow/11/system062311-2.html (reporting that not only are high 
school students ignorant of credit unions, but “the majority of [the 900] students responding to the 
survey (60%) believe that credit card companies often entice people into taking on more debt than 
they can handle”). 
 280. See What Is the Credit Union Difference?, CUNA, http://www.cuna.org/gov_affairs/ 
legislative/cu_difference.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011); see also Joe Rauch, Jax  
Federal Credit Union to Serve More Residents, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J.  
(Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2006/01/30/story2.html?page 
=all (reporting that Jax Federal Credit Union recently expanded its membership beyond federal 
employees to anyone who lives in nearby counties). 
 281. The current protracted foreclosure crisis, in which horror stories abound regarding 
mortgage companies stringing homeowners along with unfulfilled promises to modify their 
mortgage loans to prevent foreclosure, evidences creditors’ unwillingness to negotiate.  See, e.g., 
Kenneth R. Harney, FTC Targeting Foreclosure-Prevention Scams, Thousands of Homeowners 
in U.S. Have Been Victimized, BALT. SUN, Sept. 13, 2009, at 4. 
 282. See, e.g., FTC, FISCAL FITNESS: CHOOSING A CREDIT COUNSELOR 3 (2011), available 
at http://www.ponyexpr.com/cre26.pdf. 
 283. See Rana Cash, Not All Credit Services Are Equal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 27, 2010, 
at D1 (reporting that illegitimate credit counselors have names very similar to reputable ones, 
which prompted the reputable Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Greater Atlanta to change 
its name to CredAbility); Press Release, Rob McKenna, Attorney Gen., McKenna Warns 
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The weaknesses in the aforementioned possible options suggest that 
consumers do not have an informed choice and, therefore, that the injury from 
payday loans is unavoidable.   
These same options were available to military borrowers, yet Congress 
passed the Military Lending Act (MLA) to protect military borrowers.284  
Congress relied on a 2006 Department of Defense (DOD) report when passing 
the MLA, which clearly states that “[a]lternatives to payday loans and high 
interest installment loans are available through the Military Aid Societies and 
through several banks and many credit unions located on or near military 
installations.”285  Yet, the DOD report concluded that the existence of these 
low-cost loans and financial counseling efforts were insufficient to keep 
military borrowers from obtaining payday loans: “Education, counseling, 
assistance from Aid Societies, and sound alternatives are necessary but not 
sufficient to protect Service members from predatory lending practices or 
products that are aggressively marketed to consumers in general and to 
military personnel directly.”286  The report concludes unequivocally that 
“statutory protections are necessary to protect Service members from unfair, 
deceptive lending practices and usurious interest rates.”287   
Along with the DOD report’s findings, the actions of Congress, state 
legislatures, and prudential regulators confirm the conclusion that many 
payday-loan practices are unfair because they cause substantial and reasonably 
unavoidable harm to consumers that outweighs any potential benefit.  For 
example, MLA regulations and several state statutes cap the APR on payday 
loans at 36% or less,288 and the NCUA caps the APR on payday loans by 
federal credit unions at 28%.289  Similarly, the FDIC small-dollar-loan pilot 
program capped the APR on participating banks’ small-dollar loans at 36%, 
and banks participating in the program reported APRs below 36% even after 
factoring origination fees into the APR calculation.290  Notably, the FDIC pilot 
                                                                                                                                         
Consumers About Debt-Relief Scams (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
pressrelease.aspx?id=23146. 
 284. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006); see supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 285. DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 286. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 287. Id. at 46. 
 288. 32 C.F.R. § 232.4(b) (2008); e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.40(A) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2010) (capping the APR 28%). 
 289. NCUA Short-Term, Small Amount Loans Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,285, 58,286 (Sept. 24, 
2010).  After considering comments about lower and higher APRs, the NCUA decided to adopt a 
rule using a “an APR 1000 basis points above the Board approved interest rate ceiling,” thereby 
capping the APR at 28%.  Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1042(a), 124 
Stat. 1376, 2012–13 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a) (Supp. IV 2010)) 
(subjecting non-banks and mainstream financial institutions to state enforcement actions 
depending on the type of violations at issue). 
 290. A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program, 4 FDIC Q. 28, 
28 & fig.1 (2010) [hereinafter FDIC Pilot Program], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank 
/analytical/quarterly/2010_vol4_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol4No2_ SmallDollar.pdf (stating that the 
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program demonstrated that banks could achieve long-term profitability with 
APRs capped at 36%.291  
Because the CFPA prohibits the CFPB from establishing a national usury 
limit, the CFPB cannot cap the APRs on payday loans at 36%.292  It can, 
however, declare as unfair the practice of lenders charging an APR that 
exceeds the permissible interest rate as established by applicable state and 
federal laws.293  With such a declaration, a bank could not charge an active-
duty soldier an APR in excess of 36%, and a federal credit union or a non-bank 
lender could not charge, for example, an Ohio resident an APR greater than 
28% because both institutions are subject to this APR cap.294  Financial 
institutions that choose to engage in this unfair practice would, therefore, be 
subject to enforcement actions by the CFPB and state attorneys general.295   
In addition to APRs, the CFPB has grounds to declare other payday-loan 
practices unfair.  Several states, the MLA, and the NCUA ban rollovers.296  
The NCUA and several states also ban multiple outstanding loans to one 
borrower at a time and restrict multiple back-to-back loan transactions by 
imposing cooling-off periods between loans or limiting the number of loans a 
borrower can receive in a specified time frame.297  Moreover, the NCUA rules 
and the FDIC pilot-program guidelines establish minimum maturity dates and 
require installment payment plans to provide borrowers with a realistic time 
frame and manner in which to repay the loans.298  The MLA regulations also 
                                                                                                                                         
FDIC pilot program for small-dollar loans sought to “illustrate how banks can profitably offer 
affordable small-dollar loans as an alternative to high-cost credit products”). 
 291. See id. at 32. 
 292. Dodd-Frank Act § 1027(o). 
 293. See supra Part III.A. 
 294. See supra note 288–89 and accompanying text; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 1321.40(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).  If the CFPB broadly defines payday loans, as proposed 
herein, banks would be in violation of the CFPB if they issued open-ended loans with APRs 
exceeding 36% to military personnel covered under the MLA. 
 295. See supra Part III.A. 
 296. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41(G) (prohibiting a lender from “[m]ak[ing] a 
short-term loan to a borrower for purposes of retiring an existing short-term loan between any 
licensee and that borrower”); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(4) (“The Federal credit union must not 
roll-over any STS [short-term, small] loan.”); 32 C.F.R. §§ 232.1(a), 232.8(a)(1) (2008) 
(declaring it unlawful under the MLA if a lender “rolls over, renews, repays, refinances, or 
consolidates any consumer credit extended to the covered borrower by the same creditor with the 
proceeds of other consumer credit extended by that creditor to the same covered borrower, unless 
the new transaction results in more favorable terms to the covered borrower”). 
 297. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41(E) (prohibiting a licensed lender from 
“[m]ak[ing] a short-term loan to a borrower if there exists an outstanding loan between the 
licensee and that borrower”); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(3) (limiting lenders to three short-term 
loans in a six-month period and to only one outstanding loan per borrower at a given time). 
 298. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(2) (requiring that a “loan ha[ve] a minimum maturity term 
of one month”); id. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(5) (“The Federal credit union fully amortizes the loan.”); 
FDIC Pilot Program, supra note 290, at 28 (recommending a loan term of ninety days or more). 
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limit the lender’s ability to electronically access the borrower’s account unless 
the loan meets certain criteria, including an APR cap at 36%.299   
In summary, lawmakers’ and regulators’ actions establish the six 
problematic characteristics of payday loans to be unfair, and such 
characteristics, therefore, should be banned outright or restricted.  As a 
consequence, the CFPB will be on sure footing if it declares the following 
practices to be unfair and thereby unlawful: (1) usurious interest rates; (2) short 
maturity dates; (3) single balloon payments; (4) multiple rollover or 
refinancing fees; (5) multiple back-to-back loans; and (6) repetitive electronic 
bank-account access.  These practices are reasonably unavoidable and inflict 
substantial injury to consumers that is not outweighed by benefits to them. 
2.  Deceptive Practices Mislead Consumers 
In addition to declaring some practices unfair, the CFPB should declare 
some common payday practices to be deceptive.300  The CFPA does not define 
a deceptive act or practice.301  However, because the CFPA adopted the FTC 
Act’s definition of unfair,302 it seems logical that the CFPB adoption of the 
FTC Act’s definition of deceptive would be appropriate.  The FTC Act defines 
a deceptive act as “a representation, omission, or practice, . . . that is likely to 
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and . . . the 
representation, omission, or practice is material.”303  
Multiple rollovers, refinancings, and back-to-back loans are typical payday 
loan practices that should satisfy the definition of deceptive.304  When 
borrowers are unable to pay the entire loan by the original due date, payday 
lenders either impose a rollover or refinancing fee or require a back-to-back 
loan transaction in states where rollovers or refinancings are technically 
banned.305  However, the fees charged to do a rollover, refinancing, or back-to-
                                                            
 299. See 32 C.F.R. § 232.8(a)(5). 
 300. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV 2010)) (authorizing the CFPB to “prescribe 
rules applicable to a covered person or service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, 
or abusive acts or practices”). 
 301. See id. § 1031 (defining “unfair” and “abusive”). 
 302. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 303. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164–65 (1984) (citing FTC Policy Statement on 
Deception from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Rep. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC Policy 
Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm). 
 304. See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 50 (reporting that after an online lender debited a 
consumer’s bank account for $60 to $70 every two weeks for two months to cover a $300 loan, 
the lender refused to tell the consumer the amount still owed and tried to persuade her to continue 
making rollover payments). 
 305. See, e.g., Ryan Keith, State May Muzzle Payday Lenders; Loan Stores Wary of 
Proposed Rules, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Aug. 28, 2000, at 1 (reporting that one former 
manager of a payday loan store in the greater Chicago area stated that his company encouraged 
borrowers to get rollovers to the degree that borrowers paid “five times as much in fees above 
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back loan do not count toward reducing the principal of the loan and often total 
several times the original loan amount.306  Some customers believe that these 
charges reduce the outstanding amount owed and are surprised, after months or 
even years of paying fees, that the payday lender still insists that the original 
loan amount is due.307  A lender’s contractual and verbal omissions regarding 
the function and the application of such fees are materially misleading to 
consumers who are acting reasonably and thus meet the standard for a 
deceptive practice.308  The consumers’ expectation that the fee payments apply 
to their outstanding loans is reasonable given that other traditional forms of 
consumer credit allow for partial payments and a way to pay a sufficient 
amount to reduce the principal and interest.309  In fact, the deceptive practices 
of encouraging multiple rollovers or issuing back-to-back loans are considered 
so harmful to consumers that many states, the NCUA, and the MLA ban 
them.310 Consequently, the CFPB has a reasonable basis to declare these 
practices deceptive and, therefore, unlawful.  
A lender’s use of demand drafts or repetitive electronic debits to the 
borrower’s bank account for rollover or finance fees is another practice that 
also should meet the definition of deceptive.  For example, one payday-loan 
lender relies on the following contract language and thus uses demand drafts to 
drain the borrower’s bank account: “While you may revoke the authorization 
to effect . . . debit entries at any time up to 3 business days prior to the [loan’s] 
due date, you may not revoke the authorization to prepare and submit checks 
on your behalf until such time as the loan is paid in full.”311  This practice 
counters the average consumer’s ability to stop payment on checks or revoke 
                                                                                                                                         
their original loan amount”); see supra Part I.B.  In Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc., Wilma Ruby obtained a 
$500 payday loan from Cashnet.  708 S.E.2d 871, 873 (Va. 2011).  Unable to pay the debt and her 
monthly expenses on time, Ms. Ruby went to Cashnet each month for two and a half years, paid 
off her $500 principal plus a $75 finance charge, and immediately obtained a new $500 loan.  Id. 
at 874. To circumvent Virginia’s ban on rollovers and refinancings, Cashnet claimed that it had 
issued Ms. Ruby thirty-three “new” loans over that period.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Virginia 
held that “Cashnet’s practice of making a loan to Ruby immediately after she repaid a previous 
loan was a refinancing or renewal under Code § 6.2–1816(6)(i) and, therefore, in violation of the 
Act.”  Id. at 875. 
 306. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (reporting the story of Bonnie Bernhardt, 
a borrower who paid a grand total of $1600 for a $300 loan from an online payday lender); see 
also Keith, supra note 305, at 1. 
 307. See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 50 (reporting that a borrower thought she had paid off a 
$300 loan from an online lender after the lender debited her bank account for $60 to $70 every 
two weeks for two months). 
 308. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. at 164–65; see also supra note 49. 
 309. See Payday Lenders: Small Loans, Hefty Fees, Big Problem, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG 
(Jan. 2009), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/viewpoint/small-loan-big-
problems/overview/small-loan-big-trouble-ov.htm. 
 310. See supra Part II. 
 311. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 92 (statement of 
Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (emphasis added). 
2012] Payday Loan Practices and the CFPB 425 
debit authorizations.312  Moreover, the payday lenders’ practice of withdrawing 
only the rollover fee or finance charge from the bank account keeps the 
borrower indebted and burdens the borrower with determining how to pay the 
loan in full to cease electronic access.313  Again, this practice is so egregious 
that the MLA bans electronic access unless the loan transaction actually 
complies with the MLA, under which rollovers are banned.314  As a result, the 
CFPB should declare as deceptive and unlawful demand drafts and any means 
of electronic access that are set up to withdraw only rollover fees or finance 
charges, or that violate federal and state restrictions on payday loans.  This 
declaration would also include banning banks and non-banks from requiring 
consumers to agree to debit authorizations to obtain a loan.315   
3.  Abusive Practices Take Unreasonable Advantage of Consumers 
The CFPB should also use its authority to declare the problematic 
characteristics of payday loans to be abusive.  Under the CFPA, the CFPB can 
declare an act abusive if it “materially interferes with the ability of a consumer 
to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or 
service.”316  The CFPB can also declare an act abusive if it  
takes unreasonable advantage of- 
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;  
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or 
service; or  
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person 
to act in the interests of the consumer.317 
Although the CFPB may declare all of the problematic aspects of payday 
loans to be abusive, this section focuses on one practice that, heretofore, has 
not been discussed: the practice of payday lenders failing to assess the 
borrower’s ability to repay.318  Non-bank payday lenders advertise that they do 
                                                            
 312. See id. 
 313. See DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 16. 
 314. See 32 C.F.R. § 232.8(a)(5) (2008). 
 315. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (asserting that lenders require consumers to 
agree to debit authorizations); see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, 
supra note 26, at 26 (urging bank regulators to impose a “prohibition against [lenders] securing 
the loans through electronic access to a bank account—which means that recipients cannot be 
required to agree to electronic repayment, and for those who have agreed, they should be 
permitted to at any time stop the bank’s access without cost from seizing funds from their 
account[s]”). 
 316. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(1) (Supp. 2010)). 
 317. Id. § 1031(d)(2). 
 318. Id. § 1031(d). 
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not perform credit checks and that consumers can obtain a loan with as little 
documentation as a driver’s license, a pay stub, and a checking-account 
statement.319  Similarly, banks issue their versions of payday loans so long as 
the customer has a bank account set up with automatic deposit of income 
checks.320  By failing to assess the consumer’s ability to repay and by 
providing loans on the barest of documentation without undergoing a 
traditional credit check, lenders knowingly lead consumers to obtain a loan 
transaction in which they are destined to fail and thereby suffer substantial 
economic harm.  Therefore, the CFPB should prohibit as abusive the practice 
of issuing loans without doing an assessment of a borrower’s ability to repay.  
Such a declaration would be consistent with several state regulations requiring 
payday lenders to do some type of assessment321 and the FDIC pilot program 
and NCUA rule, which require the development of and adherence to guidelines 
for underwriting standards.322  Even the OCC’s regulations prohibit  
asset-based lending,323 and its guidelines for safety and soundness require a 
national bank to “assess the ability of the borrower to repay the indebtedness in 
a timely manner.”324  
Undeniably, requiring lenders to assess the borrower’s ability to pay will 
prompt lenders to refuse to issue loans to some borrowers.  However, easy 
                                                            
 319. Kim Christensen, Hooked on Debt: A Middle-Class Move to Payday Lenders, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at A1; see also Satz, supra note 37, at 128 (stating that “payday lenders 
typically require a driver’s license, paystub or other proof of income, bank statement, telephone 
bill, and checkbook”). 
 320. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 16. 
 321. See, e.g., 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(f)(3) (2010) (“A lender must make a good faith 
effort to assess the borrower’s ability to repay the payday loan or deferred presentment 
transaction under the loan terms.”). 
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stubs.”); FDIC Pilot Program, supra note 290, at 28. 
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subject to this § 7.4008 based predominantly on the bank’s realization of the foreclosure or 
liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the 
loan according to its terms.  A bank may use any reasonable method to determine a borrower’s 
ability to repay, including, for example, the borrower’s current and expected income, current and 
expected cash flows, net worth, other relevant financial resources, current financial obligations, 
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asset-based lending includes banks conditioning payday loans upon the borrowers setting up 
automatic deposits of income checks and agreeing to debit authorization to facilitate payment.  
Asset-based lending also includes non-banks issuing loans, claiming post-dated checks as 
collateral, and requiring debit authorization to facilitate payment. 
 324. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER AL 2003-2, 
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS TO GUARD AGAINST PREDATORY AND ABUSIVE LENDING 
PRACTICES 7 n.22 (2003) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 30 App. A (2002)), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2003 
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access to credit is not appropriate if the borrower is destined to default.  Denial 
of loans may sometimes lead the consumer to consider more feasible 
options.325  Consider, for example, a single mother with a past-due utility bill 
who is denied a payday loan.  If the CFPB requires lenders to provide a list of 
social-services organizations to consumers who are denied a loan, the single 
mother may learn that she qualifies for social programs, such as the Low 
Income Energy Assistance Program, which would allow her to avoid 
entrapment in a payday-loan debt cycle.326  
D.  Additional Considerations for CFPB Action 
A few additional considerations arise regarding the CFPB’s ability to declare 
payday loan characteristics as unfair, deceptive, or abusive, and, thereby, 
unlawful.  For instance, if federal lawmakers successfully reduce funding to 
the CFPB,327 then adoption of regulations like those this Article proposes will 
be crucial for empowering states to pursue enforcement actions against all 
financial institutions in noncompliance with the regulations.328  Before the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the prudential regulators’ use of the federal preemption 
doctrine to insulate banks severely hindered states in their attempts to hold 
banks accountable for their violations of state consumer-protection laws.329  
Now, under the CFPA, state regulators and attorneys general may assert the 
CFPB’s enforcement authority against a national bank or federal savings 
association for violating “a regulation prescribed by the [CFPB] under a 
provision of this title and to secure remedies under provisions of this title or 
remedies otherwise provided under other law.”330  As for non-banks, state 
attorneys general may pursue enforcement for violations of both the CFPA and 
any rules adopted by the CFPB, and state banking regulators can seek penalties 
against any institutions chartered, incorporated, or licensed in their states to 
enforce both the CFPA and the CFPB’s rules.331  Accordingly, state regulators 
and attorneys general can act to protect consumers even if the CFPB is 
hampered financially from pursuing enforcement actions.332    
                                                            
 325. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 37, at 611–13. 
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 327. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Imagine that drug manufacturers had put into the market a drug that 
seriously injured or killed 30% of its 100,000 users.  Would the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) allow the drug to stay on the market if the 
manufacturers placed crystal clear, plain-language disclosures in the drug 
packaging about the high risks of serious injury or death?  Of course  
not—drugs have been pulled off the shelf for far fewer incidents of serious 
injury or death out of concern for the physical safety of consumers.333 
A consumer’s financial well-being deserves basic protection, just as his or 
her physical well-being.  Substantial financial hardship is the equivalent of 
serious physical injury; yet, some federal lawmakers and banking regulators 
think that it is acceptable to allow banks and non-banks to flood  
low-to-moderate income communities with payday loans, one of the most 
dangerous consumer-credit products on the market today.  Persuaded, perhaps, 
that financial disclosures are sufficient, some politicians and banking 
regulators allow payday lending to occur in the face of evidence that the 
majority of payday borrowers get trapped in a cycle of debt and suffer 
substantial financial hardship, such as delaying receipt of important services, 
postponing prescription drug purchases, losing access to their bank accounts, 
and experiencing disconnection of utility services.  Some borrowers are even 
forced to file bankruptcy to obtain relief from payday-loan debt. 
Despite the unwillingness of some federal lawmakers and regulators to 
restrict the predatory aspects of payday lending directly, the newly created 
CFPB has the chance to act similarly to the FDA and protect consumers from 
payday loans.  The CFPB should adopt regulations declaring several common 
payday-loan practices as unfair, deceptive, and abusive and, therefore, 
unlawful.  As a result of these declarations, the CFPB may ban predatory 
payday-loan practices, such as charging usurious interest rates, requiring single 
balloon payments, demanding short maturity dates, and requiring multiple 
rollovers or loans.  These declarations will force bank and non-bank lenders 
either to make payday-loan products safer and affordable or withdraw from the 
payday-loan business.  Banks and credit unions that already offer affordable 
loan alternatives to payday loans can continue to emerge as responsible lenders 
to make the payday-loan market more fair and competitive. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
demonstrate a commitment to offering affordable loans to consumers.  See generally Johnson, 
supra note 82. 
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